The effects of organisational features on media attention for public organisations

Reference:
Boon Jan, Salomonsen Heidi Houlberg, Verhoest Koen.- The effects of organisational features on media attention for public organisations
Policy and politics / University of Bristol. School for Advanced Urban Studies - ISSN 0305-5736 - 47:2(2019), p. 245-263
Full text (Publisher's DOI): https://doi.org/10.1332/030557318X15407316633243
To cite this reference: https://hdl.handle.net/10067/1558970151162165141

IDENTIFYING MEDIA SENSITIVE AGENCIES: A Configurational Analysis of the Media Salience and Media Valence of Public Agencies

Abstract

This article seeks to explain why some government agencies are more likely to receive frequent, positive and/or negative media coverage. Building on insights from the agency literature and research on mediatization, hypotheses are formulated on the impact of fundamental organizational characteristics on the media salience (frequency of coverage) and valence (tone of coverage) of public agencies. A fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) is used to analyse the nuanced interplay between legal independence, primary task, and organizational size. The results show that this configurational approach is necessary to understand which public agencies are media sensitive. Legal independence, task, and size do not operate independently, but combine in explaining the media-sensitivity of agencies.

Key words: mediatization; media salience; media valence; fsQCA; public agencies

1. Introduction

Research on the media and public organizations has been shadowed by academic attention given to the media and political institutions and actors (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014). Yet, also the bureaucracies 'behind' politicians in office are subjected to media attention, and hence potentially media sensitive. The media serve both as a potential risk and as an opportunity for government agencies in a number of respects (Schillemans, 2012; Jacobs & Wonneberger, 2017), providing for at least three reasons to investigate the media salience and valence of public agencies. First, the media have developed into the most important source of information for people in advanced democracies. Virtually no political actor or institution can afford to ignore its role (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014). Second, the media serve as an institutional intermediary through which multiple stakeholders can communicate how they perceive an agency's reputation, and – by extension – as an arena in which public agencies manage their reputation (Carpenter, 2001). Third, the media is not only relevant for the reputation of agencies but also to demonstrate their legitimacy. On the one hand, the media serve as one of, if not the, most important *informal fora* in which agencies provide accounts of their behaviour to the public in general (Maggetti, 2012; Jacobs & Schillemans, 2016). Furthermore, as a *fire alarm* and/or as a *watchdog* scrutinizing government organizations, the media can trigger and amplify formal accountability processes (Jacobs & Schillemans, 2016, p. 27-28). On the other hand, agencies may voluntarily provide an account of their performance in order to demonstrate accountability (Busuioc & Lodge 2016), exploiting the media's *'third-party endorsement role'* (Jacobs & Wonneberger, 2017, p. 547; Caroll, 2010).

However, research has shown that both media salience and media valence differ across public agencies. Using theoretical insights from literature on media and newsworthiness, agencification and accountability, the paper argues that media coverage and media tone about public agencies is - at least partially - explained by the extent to which such agencies' (1) tasks are easily identifiable and evaluable for citizens and media (Bertelli 2016), (2) their work fits with the familiarity, personalization and conflict biases of media, and (3) their size makes them politically salient and capable of developing professional media relations. Hence, the variation in media salience and media valence, we argue, is related to at least three basic organizational characteristics of agencies, in terms of whether or not having legal independence, having service delivery as primary task and having a large organizational size. In this paper, we investigate the combined importance of these organizational features for agencies media sensitivity, and provides the first systematic account of how agency characteristics contribute to their “mediagenicity” (Schillemans 2012, p. 60), by investigating: *Why are some government agencies more likely to receive frequent media coverage and to receive positive and negative media coverage?*

Focussing on media attention situates this study in different research traditions. First, this article builds on recent scholarship on media attention and governance processes (Peters, 2016; Klijn & Korthagen, 2017). Scholars investigating media attention have examined the portrayal of organizations in the media and how it varies between public and private organizations (Wonneberger & Jacobs, 2017), and between government agencies (Deacon & Monk, 2001); the (positive) relation between media attention and organizational survival (Bertelli & Sinclair, 2015), or political accountability (Koop, 2011). However, we know little about what explains variance in media attention. In addition, analyses of the extent of, and differentiation within, media salience and media valence of agencies are limited, and often focused on a single type of organization (Jacobs & Wonneberger, 2017: 548;Maggetti, 2012), rather than on agencies exhibiting different organizational characteristics as subject for our subsequent analysis.

Second, the article is related to recent scholarship examining the mediatization of bureaucracies (Fredriksson, Schillemans, & Pallas, 2015; Schillemans, 2012; Thorbjørnsrud, 2015), including a special issue of this journal (Schillemans & Pierre, 2016). Albeit the lack of scholarly agreement on the definition of mediatization (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014), on an organizational level it generally refers to organizations adapting in the sense of adjusting and modifying their decisions, behavior, organizations and communication according to media’s logic (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014; Schillemans 2016). Despite the evident potential in this research, the literature often remains descriptive with fragmented case-based accounts of how public agencies deal with the media (Maggetti, 2012; Thorbjørnsrud, 2015; Yeung, 2009). Of relevance for this study, however, larger N-studies demonstrate how the media attention perceived by the organizational actors has been identified as drivers of mediatization on the organizational

(Fredriksson, Schillemans & Pallas 2015) and individual (Jacobs & Wonneberger 2017) level in public agencies. Hence, albeit this study takes a step backward by investigating an antecedent of mediatization, that is media attention as the the actual degree and tone of media coverage, it provides novel insights into the differentiated relevance of the media for government agencies that vary on core organizational characteristics.

Third, there is the more general research on agencies and agencification within public administration (Pollitt, Talbot, Caulfield, & Smullen, 2004; Verhoest, Van Thiel, Bouckaert, & Laegreid, 2012), which has dedicated only limited attention to the role of the media as accountability forum. This study connects insights from the agency literature and accountability literature (e.g. Bertelli 2016) to formulate hypotheses on the relation between fundamental agency characteristics and media salience and valence to begin to adress this limitation.

Empirically, the study uses data of coded newspaper articles (N = 2424) of 22 government agencies in Flanders (Belgium), covering a period of three years (2012-2013-2014). In contrast to previous research on objective media attention to agencies, this study examines the combined effects of several agency characteristics, rather than agencies per se. A fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) was used to assess the interplay between legal independence, primary task and organizational size with respect to media salience and media valence.

2. Media Attention of Agencies in the Context of Agencification

The paucity of interest in bureaucracies as the subjects of media attention fits with a view of bureaucracies as pathologically introverted, news-shunning organizations that execute important public duties while hiding behind politicians, routines and regulations (Schillemans & Jacobs, 2014). Concomitant with this view, the acclaimed unresponsiveness of the bureaucracy provoked a wave of structural administrative reforms across Western democracies that aimed to open up the public sector and make it more transparent and citizen-oriented (Pollitt et al., 2004).

One of these reform initiatives that triggered global governmental interest involves agencification, meaning the transfer of public tasks, such as policy implementation, public service delivery, and regulation, to agencies which are structurally disaggregated from their political principals (Verhoest et al., 2012; Overman 2016). As Overman (2016: 8; see also Van Thiel and Yesilkagit 2011, Majone 2002) asserts: "A decision to charge a task to an agency is seen as the willingness of politicians to refrain from interfering in task execution and separates politics from service delivery, which should ensure objective and independent decision-making. This act of de-politicization is expected to improve the quality and impartiality of policy implementation, as well as it should improve political credibility".

Primarily two benefits for agencification as seen from the eyes of the political principals have been suggested: credible commitment and blame shifting (Bertelli, 2008: 808-809; Hood, 2011). According to Majone (2000), the delegation of policy-making powers to non-elected institutions which, by design, are not directly accountable to voters or to their elected representatives often serves as a signal by the enacting politicians of their 'credible commitment' to certain policy choices over time. A clear example is the creation of independent regulatory agencies which regulate markets and which increase the trust of potential operators and investors in the operation of these markets. In the context of this article the benefit of blame shifting is of particular relevance. By creating agencies, politicians can delegate tasks which run the risk of encountering public criticism and thereby these politicians separate themselves from blame for disfavoured policies and outcomes (Mortensen, 2016).

However, agencification also comes with potential costs for politicians (Bertelli & Sinclair 2016: 5).Once delegated to agencies, credit claiming for successful policies becomes more difficult for the political principal (Bertelli, 2008: 809; Hood, 2011). Further, agency costs and uncertainty costs potentially increase as political control becomes more challenging, bureaucratic drift may be the result and "…independence makes it less clear to stakeholders and the public how agency policy making reflects the government's policy program and manifest commitments." (Bertelli & Sinclair, 2016: 5). Lastly, agencification may challenge democratic accountability, because agencies are non-elected bodies that operate at arm's length and are no longer under direct, full hierarchical ministerial control. Such problems might be attenuated to the extent that the agencies are easily identifiable and their activities and outcomes easily evaluable by the public (Bertelli 2016).

Several authors have pointed to the role of media as a democratic counterweight (Jacobs & Schillemans, 2016; Maggetti, 2012). Media coverage for public organizations may help reduce the political control problem, when they as 'fire-alarms' and accountability for a reduce principal's problem of asymmetric information (Koop 2011:210; Bertelli & Sinclair, 2015). However, the media may also provide information or 'cue' to citizens (and hence voters) which may 'serve as heuristics' when forming their opinion and ultimately holding politicians accountable for agency behaviours (Bertelli & Sinclair 2015:856).

3. Theorizing Differences in Agency Media Salience and Valence

Previous studies indicate that government agencies are mentioned in a large portion of newspaper coverage, but a significant clustering of coverage occurs around specific agencies. Furthermore, newspaper coverage of agencies in general seems to be thoroughly neutral (Deacon & Monk, 2001; Schillemans, 2012).

Relatively little is known, however, about what explains differentiated levels of media salience and media valence. Departing from the context of agencification, in this section we develop hypotheses related to fundamental organisational characteristics: the legal independence, task environment and size of government agencies.

3.1 Explaining variation in media salience and valence by the legal independence of public agencies

Legal independence refers to the institutional location of agencies in the administrative apparatus by indicating its distance from government. Whereas agencification reforms transformed public agencies into more complete organizations with their own autonomy, resources, culture and management, this holds even stronger for public law agencies with their own legal identity (Van Thiel, 2012). Departmental agencies have extended managerial autonomy and function at arms-length, but are still under the same legal identity as their parent ministry and hence not legally distinct from their portfolio minister and his administration. Public law agencies, in contrast, are positioned outside the legal identity of the state, with their portfolio minister only accountable to parliament and citizens for good oversight over the agencies' activities. Public law agencies are also able to act before courts (to sue or being sued in court cases), to have their own assets and their own governing board. Moreover, in European parliamentary systems, such agencies would need to present their budgets and accounts separately to parliament, whereas the budget and accounts of the departmental agencies would be included in the budget and account of the state administration (Van Thiel 2012; Verhoest et al. 2012; OECD 2012). These features make legally independent agencies more identifiable and recognizable as distinct from their portfolio minister in the eyes of citizens and media (Bertelli, 2016), and hence more likely to be held responsible. Indeed, research shows that such agencies are less susceptible to demands of their political principals (Egeberg and Trondal 2009), and more visible to media and society (Pollitt et al., 2004). Deacon and Monk (2001) found that independent agencies in the UK – public corporations and NDPB's – are subjected to media coverage to a far greater extent than Next Steps Agencies, which do not have legal independence.

The identifiability of legally independent agencies also relates to the underlying motive of creation of such agencies. Whereas some legally independent agencies are created to deliver services more efficiently and closely to citizens by limiting politicians to interfere in the management of these agencies, others are created to signal political credible commitment to specific long term policies and to ensure decision-making away from political pressure. In both cases, such agencies are more likely to establish a public media profile.

Besides its effect on media coverage, legal independence can also be expected to impact upon the media valence. First, legal independent agencies are more easily identifiable for users and media, meaning that in case of evaluable activities and outcomes, good or bad behaviour will be more directly resulting in positive or negative tone of coverage. Second, studies indicate that the relation between legal independence and de facto autonomy is not always straightforward, meaning that legal independence does not automatically safeguard agencies from interference by their political principal (Yesilkagit & Van Thiel, 2008). Being legally independent does not protect agencies from politicians engaging in different presentational strategies (Hood 2011), and narrating causal stories (Stone 1989) to keep the blame for policy failures 'at arm's length' (Bertelli, 2016, p. 218). Blame-shifting from executive politicians to agencies might be assumed to be more likely to occur in case of agencies with legal independence, since they work at further distance and are legally distinct from the Minister, resulting in more *negative* media coverage.

The potential of (negative) media coverage to lead to political sanctioning behaviour of agencies, in the most extreme case contributing to agency termination (Bertelli & Sinclair, 2015), makes it necessary for agencies to think strategically about the image portrayed to their political overseers and the public at large through the media. While the media may be used to instruct rather than to impress (Deacon & Monk, 2001), serving as a means for agencies to convey information to the general public, this may provide for an opportunity to frame themselves as experts on a subject matter. Media attention may therefore also be instrumental in providing legally independent agencies the opportunity to strategically cultivate the reputation of the agency, resulting in more *positive* coverage and ultimately contribute to bolster their autonomy (Carpenter, 2001).

3.2 Explaining variation in media salience and valence by the primary task of public agencies

Agencies perform three groups of basic public tasks, although policy development might be also be a minor task (Rolland and Roness 2010): (a) delivering general public services, and (b) regulation (inspection and scrutiny) and (c) exercising other forms of public authority (including subsidizing, granting individual monetary benefits and taxing and fining).

News media work according to a distinct set of professional norms and values, emphasizing more or less universally accepted criteria for newsworthiness such as timeliness, proximity, surprise, negativity, elite involvement, conflict and personalization (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014; Van Aelst, Sheafer, & Stanyer, 2012). Therefore the characteristics of the tasks performed by agencies are expected to affect the likelihood of appearing in the news.

Service-delivery agencies are in charge of the implementation of policies, including such activities as the purchase, ownership, provision or delivery of services or products (Rolland & Roness, 2010). Service-delivery agencies often make direct public contact when delivering their services to users and target groups (Van Thiel & Yesilkagit, 2014). They perform activities that are visible and recognizable to the general public. Service-delivery agencies thus adhere to criteria of newsworthiness related to the familiarity, potential personalization and conflict, and, in some cases, a competitive environment in which activities are performed. For instance, (Schillemans, 2012) finds that 70% of reporting to involve direct service-delivery agencies. Stories of a more technical nature, generated by regulatory or subsidizing agencies, may have a harder time getting in the news.

But having service delivery as primary task does not only affect the frequency of media coverage, but also media valence. Indeed, the direct impact on many ‘ordinary citizens’ makes such agencies vulnerable to stories framed by journalists as personal stories; that is, stories in which individual citizens’ negative experiences and arguments exposing the ‘wrongdoings’ of the agencies are presented as emotional appeals on behalf of the public. Hence, this proximity to society can backfire when single cases of individuals feeling mistreated by what they see as a cold and heartless bureaucracy are presented as archetypical stories (cf. examples in Thorbjornsrud, 2014). So service delivery agencies are more prone to negativity, personalization and conflict biases (Van Aelst et al., 2012).

Moreover, as service delivery agencies perform their tasks close to, sometimes even together with citizens and organizations, their work is relatively more easily evaluable (Bertelli 2016), as the behaviour and results of service delivery agencies are more easily observable and measurable, allowing media, citizens and users to discriminate between good and bad performance of such agencies (Bertelli, 2016). Also the outcomes of such agencies are more easily directly attributable to their actions. This observability and attributability is more challenging for citizens and media in case regulatory and subsidizing agencies, as these agencies are depending for the ultimate results of their actions upon the actors they regulate or subsidize.

3.3 Explaining variation in media salience and valence by the organizational size of public agencies

Organizational size is included in public administration studies as an important determinant of variation in a number of dependent variables (Lægreid et al., 2011). Several mechanisms can be theorized to connect organizational size in terms of staff to *frequent coverage*. First, size can be seen as a measure of organizational capacity. Larger agencies are more likely to have the capacity to put more personal and financial effort into their media relations (Fredriksson et al., 2015; Schillemans, 2012). Also, large organizations usually exhibit relatively high degrees of formalization and centralization (Lægreid, Roness, & Verhoest, 2011). This makes it more likely that a centralized media communication policy has been put in place, leading to more professionalized and frequent media relations. Second, we expect that the number of communication channels, including the media, increases in larger organizations, leading to a greater need to formally control the agency's formal appearance since coherence is crucial for reputation management (Fredriksson, 2017). Third, larger organizations, having a high number of staff, tend to operate with larger budgets (Van Thiel & Yesilkagit, 2014). This makes large agencies more politically salient, and likely to be scrutinized by several actors, including the media. In addition, agencies that operate with large budgets are more likely to have spare resources (Lægreid et al., 2011), which can be dedicated to non-core tasks of the agency, such as media communication.

But the organizational size also affects the *tone of the media coverage*. Bigger agencies are more politically salient and hence more likely to be scrutinized by the media, leading to more negative press. Yet bigger agencies have also been shown to have the capacity to install a string of accommodative structures to monitor the media to a far greater extent than small agencies (Schillemans, 2012). As a result, bigger agencies have more capacity to counter negative press with positive stories.

3.4 Explaining variation in media salience and valence: the hypotheses

In Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) studies, hypotheses are written in terms of combined expectations. Based on the arguments we developed above, the first hypothesis links to the effect of the interplay of legal independence, service delivery as primary task and organizational size on the *frequency of media coverage* (media salience):

> Hypothesis 1: Agencies will be most frequently covered if they have legal independence, service delivery as a primary task and are large.

As to the effect on *the tone of media coverage* (media valence), we formulate the following hypotheses:

> Hypothesis 2: Agencies will be most frequently covered positively, if they have legal independence, service delivery as a primary task, and are large.

> Hypothesis 3: Agencies will be most frequently covered negatively, if they have legal independence, service delivery as a primary task, and are large.

4. Research Context, Design and Methodology

4.1 Research context and data collection

The research context is the Flemish civil service. Flanders is one of three regions of the federal state of Belgium. Belgium is a dual federalist system. This means that the regional governments exercise the powers accorded to them without interference from the federal government. In this sense, the Flemish government is comparable to a full-fledged nation-state for the competences it was accorded. The Flemish government has its own parliament, government and administration.

The focus on the Flemish case offers some advantages for studying the relation between variations at the meso-organizational level and media attention. First, the principle of ministerial responsibility is applied, as in most other European countries. Also, the way and extent to which the portfolio minister can intervene is restricted by law, and the budget and accounts of legally independent agencies are separately presented to parliament. Additionally, the different types of Flemish agencies are regulated by a general framework law, implying that *within each type*, individual agencies are subject to the same rules in terms of managerial autonomy, as well as ministerial and parliamentary control. Additionally, the different agency types have been used for performing all the kinds of tasks we distinguish, and encompasses both large and small-sized organizations. The Flemish context also offers a novel perspective to the mediatization literature – which has been dominated by Scandinavian, Dutch and Anglo-Saxon contributions – by examining media attention in a Latin country with a Napoleonic administrative tradition, high levels of power distance and uncertainty avoidance, and its state-centric conception of governance with an emphasis on administrative law (Verhoest et al., 2012). In such administrative tradition emphasizing hierarchical control and administrative law, agencification provides clear prospects for blame shifting for politicians.

A dataset was assembled on the frequency and tone of newspaper coverage for the 22 central government agencies with the highest media salience. This article includes newspaper coverage data for a period of three years (2013-2014-2015) in one quality newspaper. The newspaper, 'De Standaard', is considered a leading broadsheet for national, political, foreign, financial-economic, and social news, with an issue agenda that is in line with that of other Belgian media (Vliegenthart & Walgrave, 2008). In total, 2424 articles were coded in which one of the central government agencies in our dataset was mentioned.

Data collection and coding proceeded in two steps. First, to collect the articles for each agency (variable: FREQ), the name of each agency was introduced in an online search engine (GoPress, see http://www.gopress.be). Articles for each agency were found by using one or more of the following search terms: the full and official name of the agency, part of the full and official name of the agency, full name of agency and extra key words (for instance, the name of the Flemish public transport agency, The Line, was not specific enough and ‘bus’ or ‘tram’ or ‘transport’ were added), and /or abbreviation of the name. For most agencies, the full population of articles was coded. For two agencies, sampling was done. Table 1 lists the agencies that are included in the analysis, their name translated in English, their primary task and their media salience (frequency of articles mentioning these agencies between 1/01/2013 and 31/12/2015).

[Please insert Table 1 here]

Second, the articles that contained a reference to one of the government agencies in our sample were further coded according to their tone of coverage by three trained student coders under the supervision of a master coder. Coders were asked whether the article involved a positive and/or negative opinion, if the description of the agency, or its (non-)action, included positive or negative framing. Opinions often included the use of explicit positive or negative wording (“blatant mismanagement”; “incomprehensible actions”; stakeholders who feel “mistreated” or “insulted” by agency), but not necessarily. In some cases, the action of the agency as such is described in neutral wording, but related to facts or incidents which explicitly shed a negative light on the agency (for instance: “the report by the agency underestimates actual poverty figures”; “the agency promotes holiday houses which do not adhere to its own safety regulations”; “adaptations to existing functioning are called for”).

In order to calculate the reliability of the coding, a subset of 114 articles was double coded. Coding reliability was measured using Krippendorff’s Alpha (KA) (Krippendorff 2004). The KA measure was moderate for the positive opinions (0,54) and substantial for the negative opinions (0,62). Despite the fact that these results are satisfactory given KA’s sensitivity to skewed variables (such as the ones included in this study), their moderate values gave the impetus for two actions to increase the reliability of the data. First, the coders had the opportunity, and were urged, to indicate if they had any doubt with coding an article as ‘neutral’, ‘positive’ or ‘negative’. All the articles that were coded as ‘doubtful’ were checked and, if necessary, re-coded by one of the authors. Secondly, coders were asked to give a short description in case of a negative or positive opinion. The descriptions of all articles with an opinion were also checked by one of the authors, and re-coded if necessary.

Data for the independent variables were obtained non-obtrusive data source: the 2012, 2013 and 2014 organigrams of the Flemish public sector. These data source provide objective information about the legal independence (autonomy), task and staff numbers (size) of the PSOs under study. Based on Van Thiel (2012), legal independence is measured by the legal-structural type and the formal-legal distance from government: 1 = department; 2 = semi-autonomous organization without legal independence; 3 = legally independent organization under full ministerial authority (no board); 4 = legally independent organization with a board. The primary task is taken into account by the inclusion of a dummy. “Service delivery” equals 1 for organizations being primarily active in direct service delivery to societal actors (citizens, companies, other public organizations), including advising and training citizens, companies, commercial or industrial services). Although some agencies might be performing multiple tasks, we identified the primary task of an agency by analyzing which task is most heavily emphasized in the enacting legislation and in the mission of the agency. Organizational size has been operationalized as the number of full-time equivalents working in the organization.

4.2 Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA)

Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is a case-sensitive approach (Ragin, 2008). Whereas standard regression techniques are interested in the *net effect* of distinct *independent variables* on a dependent variable, QCA takes a configurational perspective to analyse whether *combinations* of *conditions* contribute to an *outcome* (for a more detailed comparison between regression approaches and QCA approaches, see Vis, 2012).

A central feature of set-theoretic approaches is their assumption of causal complexity in describing the relationship between conditions and an outcome. Causal complexity refers to the following premises: *conjunctural causation* means that the effect of a condition is present only in combination with other conditions; *equifinality* means that an outcome can be explained by different, mutually non-exclusive conditions; and *causal asymmetry* means that the presence of the outcome may have different explanations than its absence (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).

The choice to apply fsQCA is theoretically and empirically grounded. First, theoretically, we argue that it makes sense to take a configurational view towards what explains the media salience and valence of agencies. Fredriksson, Schillemans and Pallas (2015) only find one significant independent effect (management structure) on the mediatization of Swedish agencies in their regression analysis, after which they turn to a discussion of how management matters for agencies' media profiles and reactivity. A configurational approach would allow for this finding on the significance of management structure to stand, while offering ways to look at potential effects of the other "non-significant" variables. That is, these variables may have an effect, but only in combination with other factors, similarly to the way we constructed our hypotheses. Secondly, empirically, the advantage of using fsQCA is that we are able to examine these potential combined effects on a medium-sized dataset of 22 observations (Vis, 2012), which is too small for a regression analysis and too large for in-depth case studies.

4.3 Calibration

In QCA, individual cases have membership in *sets* (for instance, each organization gets a score which reflects the degree to which it belongs to the set of 'legally independent agencies'). This article utilizes fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) in order to allow conditions to display different degrees of membership, in contrast to crisp-set QCA which is more akin to binary logic, in that cases must be either fully in (1), or fully out (0), of a set. Membership scores are generated in the *calibration procedure* based on assessment of the cases and theory (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Three anchor points define a set: full membership (membership score of 1), full non-membership (membership score of 0), and a crossover point (membership score of 0.5).

QCA standards of practice dictate that the different anchor points should not be based on the distribution of the data, but on prior theory or empirical evidence outside the own data set (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). For the set of frequently covered organizations (FREQ), we relied on population data of 61 Flemish government agencies to calculate the minimum (0; fully out of set of frequently covered organizations), maximum (1; fully in set of frequently covered organizations) and mean (0,5; crossover point – each organization with more than 19 articles each year is in the set of frequently covered organizations). For the calibration of POS and NEG, we relied on the same population data to calculate the mean share of positive and negative stories, which were used as crossover anchors – with the additional requirement that at least two articles must have contained a positive or negative reference (to avoid extreme cases with a low overall frequency of articles, including only one positive and/or negative article). The calibration of IND and SERVICE is not based on external empirical data, but on theoretically defined anchor points (for IND: having legal personality; for SERVICE: performing service delivery activities). The rationale for each calibration is presented below Table 2.

[Please insert Table 2 here]

5. Analysis

After the calibration procedure, QCA identifies complex combinations of conditions, called *configurations*. Using the fs/QCA 3.0 software, a truth table is constructed that lists all logically possible combinations of causal conditions (configurations) and sorts the cases along these logically possible combinations (Ragin, 2008). Each possible combination of conditions (2^k; k = number of conditions) is presented as a row in a *truth table* (in this study, 3 conditions lead to 8 possible rows).

QCA as a technique consists of the formal analysis of truth tables. In the so-called *logical minimization procedure*, the shortest possible causal expressions for the configurations that are sufficient and/or necessary to cause the outcome are formulated (the solution terms).[1] QCA expresses causal relationships between (combinations of) conditions and an outcome in terms of *necessity* and *sufficiency*. A condition is necessary if the outcome cannot be produced without it, while a condition is sufficient when it consistently leads to the outcome, but when the outcome can also be produced by combinations of other conditions. Following best practice, the analysis of necessary conditions is reported first (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).

QCA provides two central measures as parameters of fit: consistency and coverage. *Consistency* reflects the degree to which cases sharing a combination of conditions have the same outcome (Ragin, 2008). *Coverage* indicates how much of the outcome is covered by a condition (or a solution term).

5.1 FsQCA of necessary conditions

Table 3 presents the results from the analysis of necessary conditions. Consistency levels are followed by the coverage levels between brackets. For necessary conditions, a consistency threshold of at least 0.9 is advised (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Table 3 shows that the presence or absence (~) of none of the conditions are necessary for any of the outcomes (because none of the conditions scores above the threshold of 0.9).

[Please insert Table 3 here]

5.2 FsQCA of sufficient conditions

Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 present the results from the analyses of sufficiency. Each potential combination of the conditions represents a row in the truth tables.[2] For each row, the tables provide the number of cases that belong to this row (column N). For instance, row 3 in Table 4.1 contains 5 cases that are both independent (IND), big (BIG) and active in service delivery (SERVICE). Consistency scores should be higher than 0.75 in order to be included in the next step of logical minimization (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). The solution terms that result from the logical minimization are presented below each table.

[Please insert Table 4.1 here]

Turning to the analysis of frequent coverage (FREQ) first, we see that the included conditions taken together have a high explanatory power, with four rows with a consistency above 0.9. Legal independence (IND), being big (BIG) and being active in service delivery (SERVICE) each appear in three of the four rows that reached the consistency score of 0.75. Yet, as the analysis for necessary conditions already demonstrated, none of the conditions lead to the outcome FREQ individually. This warrants the use of a configurational perspective. If either IND, BIG or SERVICE is present, it needs at least one of the other conditions in order for FREQ to occur.

The row that contains the most cases combines legal independence (IND) with big agencies (BIG) and service delivery agencies (SERVICE). The five cases in this row include two of the most salient agencies, 'The Line – Bus company' and the 'Flemish service for job mediation and occupational education'. The analysis also gives insight into the other three rows that lead to the outcome of frequent coverage (FREQ). These rows include cases that are either not legally independent (~IND), not active in service delivery (~SERVICE) or not big (~BIG). Yet, in each of these rows, the non-membership in one of the three conditions was compensated by membership in the two other conditions.

Next, we turn to a presentation of the findings for the analyses of sufficiency for frequent positive coverage (POS; Table 4.2) and frequent negative coverage (NEG; Table 4.3).

[Please insert Tables 4.2 and 4.3 here]

First, compared to the first truth table of frequent coverage (FREQ), we see that less rows lead to the outcomes of frequent positive coverage (POS) and frequent negative coverage (NEG). Out of all potential combinations of conditions, only one row leads to POS. This row is the one with five cases that display all conditions. The sufficiency analysis for NEG shows one additional row that leads to the outcome, which contains one case. This case is the tourism agency, which, during this period, dealt with an ongoing media crisis around mistakes that were made in the publication of maps of Belgium. In one instance, for example, a map represented the French-speaking Walloon region of Belgium as being part of France. Another represented the capital, Brussels, as part of the Flemish region. Both examples are factually incorrect and infuriated the Walloon region and Brussels.

Overall, it seems that the agencies that are covered positively are the same ones that are covered negatively. A relation also exists between those that are covered frequently and those that are covered positively/negatively, yet this relation is not always straightforward. While several causal pathways are present for frequent coverage (FREQ), only IND*BIG*SERVICE also leads to frequent positive coverage (POS) and frequent negative coverage (NEG) (leaving aside the tourism agency in NEG). Implications are discussed in the next section.

6. Discussion and Conclusion

This article set out to explore why some agencies are more frequently covered in newspaper media, and why they are covered more positively and/or negatively. Building on the premise that organizational characteristics matter for agencies' sensitivity to media pressures, we examined the combined effect of agencies' legal independence, primary task and size.

Our configurational fsQCA approach demonstrates that legal independence, service delivery task and size matter for understanding media coverage, but only *when at least two of these characteristics combine* (supporting H1). Other paths also lead to the outcome of frequent coverage, yet in no path does the presence of an individual condition coupled to the absence of the other conditions lead to frequent coverage. Applying fsQCA, thus, led to a fuller understanding of the conditions under which each outcome occurs (Vis, 2012).

Relating these findings to our theoretical framework, we find that legally independent agencies overall appear more frequently in the media than legally non-independent agencies. This supports the notion that the media serve as an accountability forum for legally independent agencies that operate at arms-length (Jacobs & Schillemans, 2015; Maggetti, 2012), and that a core motivation to establish legally independent agencies was to create administrations that are either closer to the people, able to provide credible commitment or allow blame shifting away from politicians (Pollitt et al., 2004). Service-delivery agencies that, as compared to regulatory and subsidizing agencies, perform activities that are more familiar to the general public, more easily evaluable and have a greater potential for personalization and conflict, are also more present in the media (Schillemans, 2012). Lastly, bigger agencies in terms of staff are more media salient, which indicates that big fish are easier to catch (Deacon & Monk, 2001). None of these conditions, however, were necessary for explaining frequent media attention.

A similar picture emerged in our analyses of media valence. We find full support for hypotheses 2 and 3, which expected the interplay of legal independence, service delivery activities and size to contribute to both more positive and more negative coverage. Our findings thus suggest that, when dealing with the news, one must take ‘the good with the bad.’ Legally independent agencies are more easily identifiable and more scrutinized in the media for their good *and* bad performance (Hood, 2002; Pollitt et al., 2004). As theorized, service-delivery agencies were overall more prone to negativity, personalization and conflict biases inherent in media reporting (Thorbjørnsrud, 2015; Van Aelst et al., 2012), but they were also more likely to appear positively in the news, which might suggest their strategic orientation towards news management as means to secure a favourable reputation in the eyes of their key stakeholders. Lastly, bigger agencies seem to be more heavily scrutinized as a result of their salience, but also to have the capacity to achieve positive press.

The conclusion that legally independent, large, service delivering agencies is subject for both more positive and negative media coverage relates to these agencies being identifiable, evaluable and salient at the same time. Moreover it triggers the questions whether all news about an agency is good news? While negative media coverage may lead to political sanctioning behavior, it may also provide the opportunity for agencies to subsequently cultivate their reputation by responding to negative media coverage. However, the conditions under which news coverage of either a positive, negative or neutral nature is ‘good news’ would expectedly be contingent on more contextual factors then the organizational characteristics identified in this research. In addition, the ‘neutral’ coverage of agencies deserved more attention in future research. While neutral coverage may reflect mere descriptions of agencies providing different types of information to the public, they may also be the result of agencies’ successful narration and framing of their behaviour *as* neutral, rather than as the cause of policy failures and problems to the media (Stone 1989). Further, in the context of a partisan environment providing neutral information may serve both political and/or bureaucratic interests as conveying information as neutral may provide for the opportunity to put an issue on the political and public agenda.

Our findings contribute to a number of different literatures. First, in relation to the literature on media attention and bureaucracies' our core contribution departs by demonstrating the relevance of broadening the methodological approaches to include configurational fsQCA to demonstrate the importance of the combined effects of organizational characteristics for agencies media sensitivity. Second, we contribute to research on the mediatization of agencies by providing a systematic cross-case analysis of what explains a potential antecedent of mediatization, being actual media attention. This insights may offer a first step toward understanding the apparently complex relationship between actual news coverage and successive processes of mediatization (Esser, 2013; Fredriksson, Schillemans & Pallas 2015; Jacobs and Wonneberger 2017). A central question for future research is how actual media pressures are related to more subjective processes of self-mediatization (Esser, 2013). Self-mediatization refers to the process in which agencies are proactively anticipating media pressures, regardless of the actual frequency and tone of media coverage. Whether and how differences in perceived and actual media attention can be explained through (the combination of) organizational characteristics included in this study would be an important next step.

Third, we contribute to the literature on agencies and agencification, by demonstrating how the institutional choice reflected in agencification for service delivery and large, legally independent agencies seems to lead in practice to more identifiable, evaluable and salient organizations that attract more media attention, both with respect to their successes and failures (Bertelli, 2016, Pollitt et al., 2004).

Fourth, our findings speak to the accountability literature, increasing understanding of the conditions under which the media can serve as an accountability forum for public organizations. According to Bertelli (2016), under conditions of identifiability and evaluability, citizens and users, but also media, can assign responsibility for good and bad performance to the public organizations themselves, rather than to the political principals responsible for them. Understanding which organizational features make public organizations identifiable and evaluable is hence relevant. Whether this provides for more democratic accountability in relation to those agencies is, however, further depending on the subsequent behaviour of the actors who ultimately are the ones imposing accountability, that is the voters. Future research may hence investigate whether media attention per se provides for such evaluation, which may both depend on the competencies of the media and the degree to which agencies pursue different strategies to escape being held accountable or shift blame , e.g. by reallocating the 'source', providing 'obfuscating information', use their reputation to 'gloss processes and outcomes' decreasing their reliability (Bertelli, 2016, p. 219).

In terms of practical implications, first, the variance in media valences point to the important issue of the degree to which politicians and citizens may rely on the media as in formal forum of accountability. This is especially true for regulatory agencies, where the technical nature of their activities seems to lead to less, and more neutral, coverage, challenging evaluation. Contradicting earlier studies (Maggetti, 2012; Yeung, 2009). Second, for bureaucrats our study provides them with knowledge of whether they are positioned in an organization which is media sensitive. Such knowledge may enable them to consider the amount of resources needed to 'make it to the news' (Jacobs & Wonneberger 2017), The knowledge that seeking media attention not only provides for opportunities to cultivate agency reputation, but also comes with the risk of more negative media coverage, is of further relevance for the type of communication capacity needed.

This study is not without limitations. In terms of methods, although fsQCA is highly suited to analyse the effect of the interplay of a limited set of conditions on an outcome, it cannot accommodate a wide range of variables. In this respect, while we made the argument for the newsworthiness of the media sensitive organizations, our data is limited in terms of being agency-centric. Future research may provide more nuanced insight into media-centric explanations of why the media distribute their attention to agencies differently.

Furthermore, our hypotheses were formulated on the basis of insights from the agency literature and mediatization literature, which are both widespread and well-documented phenomena. This increases our confidence that the effects we observe are applicable outside the Flemish context. That said, it is an empirical question to what extent our findings will hold for other types of political actors and in other contexts. The Flemish civil service has some cultural traits related to its Napoleonic administrative tradition that it does not share with the Scandinavian, Dutch and Anglo-Saxon cases that have dominated the mediatization literature. How these macro-cultural traits influence media salience and valence at the meso-organizational level is outside the scope of this paper, yet we encourage future research to increase our understanding in this respect.

7. Notes

[1] For instance, suppose both A*B*C and A*B*~C consistently show the outcome. In such a case, the presence or absence of C does not influence the occurrence of the outcome This reduces primitive expressions to simpler combinations of conditions; e.g., $A*B*C \leq Y$ and $A*B*{\sim}C \leq Y$ are simplified to $A*B \leq Y$ (Lewigie, 2013).

[2] There is one logical remainder row for which no empirical information exists. There are no cases that display the combination ~IND*BIG*~SERVICE. This row was hence not included in the logical minimization.

8. References

Bertelli, A. M. (2008). Credible Governance? Transparancy, Political Control, the Personal Vote and British Quangos. Political Studies, 56 (4):807-829.

Bertelli, A. M (2016). Who Are the Policy Workers, and What Are They Doing? Citizens' Heuristics and Democratic Accountability in Complex Governance. Public Performance & Management Review, 40 (2): 208-234

Bertelli, A. M., & Sinclair, J. A. (2015). Mass Administrative Reorganization, Media Attention, and the Paradox of Information. Public Administration Review, 75(6), 855–866

Bertelli, A. M., & Sinclair, J. A. (2016). Democratic Accountability and the Politics of Mass Administrative Reorganization. British Journal of Political Science, 1–21.

Busuioc, M. & Lodge, M. 2016. "The Reputational Basis of Public Accountability", Governance, 29(2):347-263

Carpenter, D. (2001). The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies 1862-1928. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Deacon, D., & Monk, W. (2001). "New managerialism" in the news: Media coverage of quango's in Britain. Journal of Public Affairs, 1(2), 153–166.

Esser, F. (2013). Mediatization as a Challenge: Media Logic versus Political Logic. In in H. Kriesi, D. Bochsler, J.Matthes, S. Lavenex, M. Bühlmann and F. Esser (eds), Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization. (pp. 155–176). Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Fredriksson, M., Schillemans, T., & Pallas, J. (2015). Determinants of Organizational Mediatization: An Analysis of the Adaptation of Swedish Government Agencies to News Media. Public Administration, 93(4), 1049–1067.

Jacobs, S., & Schillemans, T. (2016). Media and public accountability: typology and exploration. Policy & Politics, 44(1), 23-40

Jacobs, D. & Wonneberger, A. (2017). Did we make it to the news? Effects of actual and percieved media coverage on media orientations of communication professionals. Public Relations Review 43: 47-559

Klijn, E. H. & Korthagen, I. (2017). Governance and Media Attention: A research Agenda About How Media Affect (Network) Governance Processes, Perspectives on Public Management and Governance. 1-11.

Koop, C. (2011). Explaining the Accountability of Independent Agencies: The Importance of Political Salience. Journal of Public Policy, 31(2): 209-234

Maggetti, M. (2012). The media accountability of independent regulatory agencies. European Political Science Review, 4(3), 385–408.

Majone, G. (2000). The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(2), 273–302.

Mazzoleni, G., & Schulz, W. (1999). “Mediatization” of Politics: A Challenge for Democracy? Political Communication, 16(3), 247–261.

Mortensen, P. B. (2016). Agencification and Blame Shifting: Evaluating a Neglected Side of Public Sector Reforms. Public Administration, 94(3), 630–646

Overman, S. (2016). Great Expectations of Public Service Delegation: A systematic Review. Public Management Review, 18(8): 1238-1262.

Peters, G. B. (2016). Governance and the media: Exploring the linkages. Policy & Politics, 44(1), 9-22.

Pollitt, C., Talbot, C., Caulfield, J., & Smullen, A. (2004). Agencies: How Governments Do Things through Semi-autonomous Organizations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ragin, C. (2008). Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rolland, V. W., & Roness, P. G. (2010). Mapping Organizational Units in the State: Challenges and Classifications. International Journal of Public Administration, 33(10), 463–473.

Schillemans, T. (2012). Mediatization of Public Services: How Organizations Adapt to News Media. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.

Schillemans, T. (2016). Fighting or fumbling with the beast? The mediatization of public sector agencies in Australia and the Netherlands. Policy & Politics, 44(1), 79-96

Schillemans, T., & Jacobs, S. (2014). Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Framing Public Organizations in the News. In Organizations and the Media Organizing in a Mediatized World (pp. 147–161). London: Routledge.

Schillemans, T., & Pierre, J. (2016). Entangling and disentangling governance and the media. Policy & Politics, 44(1), 1–8.

Schneider, C. Q., & Wagemann, C. (2012). Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences: A Guide to Qualitative Comparative Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Stone, D. (1989). Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas. Political Science Quarterly, 104(2): 281-300

Strömbäck, J., & Esser, F. (2014). Mediatization of politics: Towards a theoretical framework. In F. Esser & J. Strömbäck (Eds.), Mediatization of politics: Understanding the

Thorbjørnsrud, K. (2015). Mediatization of Public Bureaucracies: Administrative versus Political Loyalty. Scandinavian Political Studies, 38(2), 179–197.

Van Aelst, P., Sheafer, T., & Stanyer, J. (2012). The personalization of mediated political communication: A review of concepts, operationalizations and key findings. Journalism, 13(2), 203–220.

Van Thiel, S. (2012). Comparing Agencies across Countries. In Government Agencies: Practices and Lessons from 30 Countries (pp. 18–29). Palgrave Macmillan.

Van Thiel, S., & Yesilkagit, K. (2014). Does task matter? The effect of task on the establishment, autonomy and control of semi-autonomous agencies. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 80(2), 318–340.

Verhoest, K., Van Thiel, S., Bouckaert, G., & Laegreid, P. (2012). Government agencies: practices and lessons in 30 countries. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wonneberger, A. & Jacobs, S. (2017). Media positioning: comparing organizations' standing in the news. Corporate Communications: An International Journal, 22(3): 354-368

Yesilkagit, K., & Van Thiel, S. (2008). Political influence and bureaucratic autonomy. Public Organization Review, 137–153.

Yeung, K. (2009). Presentational Management and the Pursuit of Regulatory Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Competition and Consumer Agencies in the United Kingdom and Australia. Public Administration, 87(2), 274–294.

Tables to include

Table 1: Case information

Full Name (Flemish)	Full name (English)	Primary task	Frequency coverage	Frequency positive coverage	Frequency negative coverage
Agentschap voor Natuur en Bos	Agency for nature and forestry	Service delivery	197	11	18
Instituut voor Natuur- en Bosonderzoek	Institute for nature and forestry research	Service delivery	44	0	1
Zorg en gezondheid	Care and health	(Re) distributive	54	2	1
Agentschap Ondernemen	Agency for commerce	Service delivery	31	0	1
Agentschap Wonen (Vlaanderen)	Housing Flanders	(Re) distributive	3	0	1
Kunsten en Erfgoed	Arts and heritage	(Re) distributive	3	1	0
Vlaamse Milieumaatschappij	Flemish environment agency	Regulatory	128	0	6
Vlaamse Regulator van de Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt	Flemish regulator for energy and gas	Regulatory	81	9	10
Vlaamse Regulator voor de Media	Flemish regulator for media	Regulatory	32	0	1
Vlaamse Dienst voor Arbeidsbemiddeling en Beroepsopleiding	Flemish service for work mediation and professional education	Service delivery	310*	23	24
Kind en Gezin	Child and family	Service delivery	200	10	13
Openbare Vlaamse Afvalstoffenmaatschappij	Public Flemish waste disposal agency	(Re) distributive	97	1	3
Agentschap voor Innovatie door Wetenschap en Technologie	Institute for science and technology	(Re) distributive	43	3	5
Vlaams Agentschap voor Personen met een Handicap	Flemish agency for people with a disability	(Re) distributive	44	1	10
Toerisme Vlaanderen	Tourism Flanders	Service delivery	117	4	10
Zorginspectie	Care inspection	Regulatory	25	1	1
Inspectie RWO	Inspection spatial planning and housing policy	Regulatory	12	1	4
Instituut voor Landbouw- en Visserijonderzoek	Institute for agriculture and fishery research	Service delivery	25	0	0
De Lijn	The Line (public transport agency)	Service delivery	345**	16	65
Agentschap ter Bevordering van de Lichamelijke Ontwikkeling, de Sport en de Openluchtrecreatie	Agency for the promotion of physical development, sports and outdoor recreational activities	Service delivery	91	4	8

Agentschap voor Wegen en Verkeer	Agency for roads and traffic	Service delivery	506	14	67
Waterwegen en Zeekanaal	Water roads and canals	Service delivery	137	13	38

*This is a sample: 71% of total number of 436 articles

**This a sample: 35% of total number of 983 articles

Table 2: Calibration

Frequent coverage (FREQ*)	0 = fully out of set	Average of 0 articles mentioning agency per year (minimum in population*)
	0.5 = crossover point	Average of 19 articles mentioning agency per year (average in population)
	1 = fully in set	Average of 328 articles mentioning agency per year (maximum in population)
Positive coverage (POS*)	0 = fully out	Less than 5% of articles mentioning agency, portray agency in a positive way + less than two positive articles
	1 = fully in	At least 5% of articles mentioning agency, portray agency in a positive way + at least 2 positive articles
Negative coverage (NEG*)	0 = fully out	Less than 9% of articles mentioning agency, portray agency in a negative way + less than two negative articles
	1 = fully in	At least 9% of articles mentioning agency, portray agency in a negative way + at least 2 negative articles
Legal independence (IND)	0 = full out	Type A: no legal personality
	0.75 = more in than out	Type B: legal personality, under full ministerial authority
	1 = fully in	Type C: legal personality, governing board (no full ministerial authority)
Big agencies (BIG**)	0 = fully out of set	18 full time equivalents (minimum in population)
	0.5 = crossover point	498 full time equivalents (average in population)
	1 = fully in set	7726 full time equivalents (maximum in population)
Service delivery agencies (SERVICE)	0 = fully out	Agency does not primarily perform service delivery tasks
	1 = fully in	Agency primarily performs service delivery tasks

*Population data for FREQ, POS and NEG were taken from a related study in which the frequency, number of positive articles and number of negative articles for each agency was collected for the full population of Flemish government agencies (N = 61)
**Population data for size were taken from government documents (websites, annual reports).

Table 3: Analysis of necessary conditions

	FREQ	POS	NEG
IND	0.68 (0.61)	0.82 (0.55)	0.66 (0.69)

~IND	0.47 (0.39)	0.19 (0.11)	0.34 (0.33)
BIG	0.70 (0.98)	0.50 (0.52)	0.40 (0.66)
~BIG	0.74 (0.46)	0.50 (0.23)	0.60 (0.43)
SERVICE	0.65 (0.55)	0.71 (0.45)	0.64 (0.64)
~SERVICE	0.35 (0.30)	0.29 (0.18)	0.36 (0.36)

Note: '~' means absence of condition

Table 4.1: Analysis of sufficient conditions (truth table – outcome = FREQ)

Row	IND	BIG	SERVICE	N	Consistency
1	1	1	0	1	1.000
2	0	1	1	2	0.995
3	1	1	1	5	0.994
4	1	0	1	1	0.917
5	0	0	1	3	(-) 0.559
6	1	0	0	5	(-) 0.498
7	0	0	0	5	(-) 0.304
8	0	1	0	0	?

Solution term 1: SERVICE*BIG (r.c.: 0.532; u.c.: 0.167; con.: 0.994)
Solution term 2: IND*BIG (r.c.: 0.486; u.c.: 0.121; con.: 0.996)
Solution term 3: IND*SERVICE (r.c.: 0.422; u.c.: 0.057; con.: 0.756)
Solution coverage: 0.711
Solution consistency: 0.838

Table 4.2: Analysis of sufficient conditions (truth table – outcome = POS)

Row	IND	BIG	SERVICE	N	Consistency
1	1	1	1	5	0.820
2	1	0	1	1	(-) 0.485
3	1	0	0	5	(-) 0.391
4	0	1	1	2	(-) 0.352
5	0	0	1	3	(-) 0.175
6	1	1	0	1	(-) 0.114
7	0	0	0	5	(-) 0.000
8	0	1	0	0	?

Solution term 1: IND*SERVICE*BIG (r.c.: 0.404; u.c.: 0.404; con.: 0.820)
Solution coverage: 0.404
Solution consistency: 0.820

Table 4.3: Analysis of sufficient conditions (truth table – outcome = NEG)

Row	IND	BIG	SERVICE	N	Consistency
1	1	1	1	5	0.841
2	1	0	1	1	0.813

3	0	1	1	2	(-) 0.676
4	1	0	0	5	(-) 0.548
5	0	0	1	3	(-) 0.331
6	1	1	0	1	(-) 0.272
7	0	0	0	5	(-) 0.233
8	0	1	0	0	?

Solution term 1: IND*SERVICE (r.c.: 0.409; u.c.: 0.409; con.: 0.857)
Solution coverage: 0.409
Solution consistency: 0.857