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THE OBIDIL AND THE MAN OF GLASS:
Denarration, Genesis and Cognition in Beckett’s Molloy, Malone meurt / Malone Dies and L’Innommable / The Unnamable

Dirk Van Hulle

The research hypothesis of this essay is that Beckett’s practice of “denarration” (Richardson 2001) is not only relevant to narratology, but also has a genetic and a cognitive dimension. The manuscripts of Molloy, Malone meurt and L’Innommable are examined to show how both the synchronic and the diachronic structures of these texts play a role in Beckett’s inquiry into the human mind and how the techniques of dis- and denarration are deployed to challenge old models of the mind and intimate more recent cognitive theories that consider the mechanics of the mind in terms of narrative intelligence.

In “Narrative and Mind: Directions for Inquiry” (2013), David Herman emphasizes that investigations of the mind-narrative nexus often consist of a unidirectional borrowing by narrative scholars of ideas from the cognitive sciences (202). Instead, he pleads for a bidirectional exchange of ideas between narrative theory and cognitive sciences, suggesting that literary narratologists studying fictional minds can contribute to the sciences of the mind in general. This implies that “scholars of story” (202) need to find methods and strategies “for exploring ways in which scholarship on narrative can inform, and not just be informed by, research on the mind” (203). The method this essay suggests is a combination of genetic criticism and cognitive narratology.

From a narratological perspective, this essay focuses on the role of “disnarration” and “denarration” in evocations of fictional minds. In “Denarration in Fiction: Erasing the Story in Beckett and Others” (2001) Brian Richardson defines denarration as “a kind of narrative negation in which a narrator denies significant aspects of her narrative that had earlier been presented as given” (168). He contrasts this working definition with Gerald Prince’s concept of the “disnarrated,” denoting “possible events that, though referred to, remain unactualized in a text” (169). Richardson subsequently identifies a series of instances of denarration and presents them as a continuum of narrative negation. This continuum ranges from denarration ‘light’ to substantial narrative negations as forms of “extreme narration” (Richardson 2006).

(1) Mild forms of denarration consist of statements that trespass slightly beyond the basic conventions of realism and that modify, qualify, or negate material that had been presented as “given,” but without creating narrative gaps that cannot easily be processed by readers. Here, “the denarration remains distinctly local, indeterminacies are temporary, and the stability of the represented world is not seriously challenged” (Richardson 2001, 171).

(2) Towards the middle of the continuum, Richardson locates narrative negation that may be either a remaking of the narrative world or a form of narration that unfolds in a “less determinate ontology where fact and allegory, history and fiction, and the literal and the metaphorical regularly slide into one another; there is considerably less stable, determinate narrative there to be controverted” (171).

(3) To illustrate the more extreme side of the continuum, Richardson refers to Beckett’s Molloy, in which “very little (if anything) is left over after the assaults of textual negation the narrative performs upon itself” (171). Brian McHale has termed these narrative instances of denarration “Worlds under Erasure” (1991 [1987], 99-111). The standard example is the closing paragraph of Molloy: “Then I went back into the house and wrote, It is midnight. The rain is beating on the windows. It was not midnight. It was not raining” (Beckett 2009b, 184).
In Beckett’s ‘three novels’ the techniques of dis- and denarration give shape to an increasingly sophisticated way of questioning accepted notions of cognition. Building on the previously explored research hypothesis that Beckett challenged the Cartesian model of the mind (Van Hulle 2012), and that some of his prefigure a cognitive model that comes close to Daniel C. Dennett’s notions of the Multiple Drafts Model, this essay argues that Beckett’s novels Molloy, Malone meurt and L’Innommable can be read as inquiries into the narrative mechanisms of the mind. If consciousness can be viewed in terms of storytelling, as cognitive philosophers such as Antonio Damasio, Daniel Dennett, Daniel Hutto, Richard Menary, J. D. Velleman and others suggest, and when the act of storytelling in Molloy, Malone meurt and L’Innommable is regarded from a cognitive point of view, the function of special forms of narration, such as dis- and denarration, may be of interest to sciences of the mind in general. The study of these narrative strategies can therefore potentially contribute to the bidirectional exchange of ideas between narrative theory and cognitive sciences, advocated by David Herman.

As indicated above, the method for this approach to cognition is a combination of narratology and genetic criticism. By adding a genetic dimension to cognitive narratology the essay examines the notion of narrative consciousness from the production side of “worldmaking” (Goodman 1978). This genetic dimension will be analysed by means of a case study from each of the three novels, Molloy, Malone meurt and L’Innommable.

**Molloy and the Obidil: Ballyba’s Disnarrated Economy**

In *Molloy*, dozens of pages into the second part of the novel, Moran all of a sudden mentions the character of “the Obidil” (170), out of the blue. The Obidil’s story, which remains “unactualized” in the text, is a special case of disnarration, for it was actualized in the manuscript. As Magessa O’Reilly has shown, it refers to a long passage earlier in the manuscript, which the Centre for Manuscript Genetics (University of Antwerp) edited in 2008 for an exhibition at the Harry Ransom Center.¹ In this passage, Moran takes his time – thirteen pages – to explain everything he knows about the economy of Ballyba, the Molloy country. According to this account, the citizens’ stools were the source of Ballyba’s riches since the whole economy was based on excrement. Starting from the age of two, every citizen was to obligate the O.M., short for Organisation Maraîchère [Market Gardening Organisation], with a certain amount of fecal matter every year, to be delivered on a monthly basis. As a rule, the residents of Ballyba stayed at home. Only certain officials, such as the mayor or the officers of the O.M., could absent themselves without recompense for a period of no longer than eight days at the most, on condition that they could justify their absence with a travel order. The travel orders were very difficult to obtain and were delivered by a strange character called the Odibil. (In the manuscript, the character’s name was initially a different anagram of libido [Odibil], not yet its mirror image Obidil, as in the published text; in the partial typescript, the Odibil is already changed into Obidil [1947b, 214]). Before taking up office, the Odibil had to swear an oath, which obliged him to live virtuously, to wear only clothes of an immaculate whiteness, and never to leave his house. It was believed that only death could relieve him of his obligation to perform his duties (Beckett 1947a, 4.7, 69r).

After having given a brief description of the Odibil, Moran in his capacity as narrator decides not to add anything because he says he will have the chance to behold the Odibil of Ballyba from closeby (69r). The only extra information he gives in this connection is that the old Odibil has deceased. There are no applicants for the post of the Odibil (and here, the manuscript switches from Odibil to Obidil), but the entire population gathers on the large square in front of his house, where it designates its preferred successor. Whoever is empowered with the position does not have the right to reject it, but has to go and live in his new, splendid abode without delay, putting on the obligatory white clothes, white gloves and white hat, in order to appear on the balcony and present himself to the crowd.

When, later in the manuscript, Moran refers back to this description, he simply mentions it as the moment when he stopped talking about the Obidil, saying that he was going to see him from closeby (Beckett 1947a, fourth Molloy notebook 5.1, 47r) and now admitting that eventually he never saw him. In the published versions of the text, this simple announcement that he was going to see him was
changed into a longing. The Obidil as he appears out of the blue in the published text of Molloy is described as follows:

And with regard to the Obidil, of whom I have refrained from speaking, until now, and whom I so longed to see face to face, all I can say with regard to him is this, that I never saw him, either face to face or darkly, perhaps there is no such person, that would not greatly surprise me.

(Beckett 2009, 170; emphasis added)

In the manuscript, Moran says he has stopped (rather than refrained from) speaking of him, announcing that he was going to (rather than longing to) see him from close by (47r). The difference between the variant readings “stopped” and “refrained from” may seem small, but from a narratological point of view it is as big as the difference between narration and disnarration.

In the published version, Moran introduces a character and no sooner has he uttered his name than he doubts this person’s existence within the storyworld. Instead of an Obidil whom he confidently expected to be seeing soon, the character becomes the object of yearning or even desire: the Obidil, “whom I so longed to see face to face” (Beckett 2009, 170). The obvious link with libido suggests a parody of Freud’s theories (see for instance O’Hara 1992) and other works on psychology which Beckett read in the 1930s. Possibly, even the very act of cutting the thirteen-page passage can be read as a parody of forms of repression, but what is being disnarrated here is more than a reference to Freud.

With regard to the excremental aspect of Ballyba’s economy, Irish literature has a long tradition of scatological satire, Jonathan Swift’s poems such as The Lady’s Dressing Room and Cassius and Peter being among the most famous examples. The tension between the immaculate appearance of the Obidil as the mirror image of libido versus the shit that keeps the economy going is just as strong as the tension in Swift’s poems between the idealized Celia and the realization that she is also merely a human animal – “Oh! Celia, Celia, Celia shits!” (Gilmore 1976, 38).

Apart from his capacity as a satirist, Swift was the Dean of Saint Patrick’s Cathedral in Dublin, the city after which Bally is probably modelled (Morin 2009, 62). There are instances in the manuscripts of the three novels that corroborate this hypothesis. In the earliest French manuscript of L’Innommable, Beckett originally wrote “Baile atha Clíath” (followed by the narrator’s disclaimer that he cannot guarantee that it is spelled correctly). The Irish name for Dublin (“town of the hurdles ford”) was later replaced by “Bally.” It is not surprising that Bally is modelled after Dublin, but this direct connection does strengthen the hypothesis that what is being disnarrated in Molloy is related to a historical economic context (see Adam Winstanley’s contribution to this volume). Following Adam Winstanley’s suggestion to read the satire alongside Joseph Hone and Mario M. Rossi’s biography Swift: or, The Egotist (1934), to which Beckett assisted (Pilling 2011, 238), it may be useful to zoom in on Hone and Rossi’s suggestion that “not only does he [Swift] urge upon his countrymen the duty of cultivating their own garden, but he proposes to nullify English law within the Constitution” (260). To a student and ex-lecturer of French literature at TCD, the cultivation of one’s own garden would most probably have sounded like a direct quotation from Voltaire’s Candide, the last sentence of which concludes with: “il faut cultiver notre jardin.” This Voltairian element adds an extra intertextual dimension to the complex parody. Beckett was familiar with Voltaire’s satirical sneers, as indicated by the references to the Lettres d’Amabed in his Italian Bible (in his personal library), marking scatological passages to which Voltaire draws attention (for instance Ezekiel 4:15: “Then he said unto me, Lo, I have given thee cow’s dung for man’s dung, and thou shalt prepare thy bread therewith”).

The Voltairian twist to the Swiftian satire also complicates the religious dimension to Beckett’s omitted passage, which seems to include a critique of the presence of Catholicism in Irish politics and economics of the 1930s. For in addition to the many ways in which the figure of the Obidil may be interpreted, several aspects of his description (the obligation to live virtuously, the whiteness of his clothes, the crowd gathering on the large square, his appearances on the balcony, the fact that he is usually only replaced when he dies) suggest a reference to a papal figure. From such a papal figure, one might expect that his function would be the prerogative to decide, for instance, who can “travel”.

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to heaven and who cannot; and against such a celestial background, the excrement-based economy of Ballyba by extension might even stand for earth as a whole, “die Erde” in German, which Beckett turned into “merde” when he quoted Goethe’s Faust with a twist in the addenda to Watt: “Die Merde hat mich wieder” (219).

But as in Swift’s line “Oh! Celia, Celia, Celia shits” the revered Obidil’s function, within the satirical context of the omitted passage, seems to be related to much more mundane or down-to-earth business. The link between religion (the pope-like figure of the Obidil) and economic policy (the excrement-based economy of Ballyba) is perhaps not self-evident at first sight, but as Geert Lernout notes, the Catholic hierarchy and the Irish movement for home rule were inextricably intertwined (42). This close relationship, which began in 1878 with the death of the conservative cardinal Cullen (42), was “instrumental in establishing the equation of Irishness and Catholicism […] that would have a crucial influence on the formation of the new Irish state in 1922” (48). This interconnection was still in place when, in the 1930s, Ireland chose to pursue a policy of economic protectionism and to build an “indigenous” industry, “producing primarily for the home market” (Neary and Ó Gráda, 250).

The focus on indigenous production, sprung from the land, was a theme Beckett had already tried to satirize before. In 1934, he had been toying with the idea of a satire, modeled after Daniel Defoe’s The True-Born Englishman – “A true-born Englishman’s a contradiction, / In speech an irony, in fact a fiction” (194-95). With “a strong weakness for oxymoron” (Beckett 2010a, 32), Beckett’s “Trueborn Jackeen” notes not only focus on the ethnic mixture that constitutes the contradiction of a “trueborn” Dubliner; they also contain details about the effects of insularity, notably the retarded development of Irish flora and fauna after the ice age (TCD MS 10971/2/8).

To the extent that these are all elements of narratives connected to a homeland or hometown (Bally – Baile Átha Cliath – Dublin), they partially define Molloy’s identity. And their omission may consequently be relevant in connection with what Eric P. Levy has termed the “repudiation of selfhood” (101). Evidently, there are many possible answers to the question what is being satirized or parodied in the omitted passage, and why it was eventually omitted. But from a narratological perspective, the most pressing question is why it was not entirely omitted. For Beckett deliberately left a few traces. While the omitted passage with its prospective encounter with the Obidil was “dissnarrated” (a possible event that remains unactualized in the text), Beckett gave the act of disnarration a denarrative twist. The omitted passage is part of the “mémorie du contexte” (Ferrer 2011, 120). Beckett could easily have refrained from including the question “What then was the source of Ballyba’s prosperity?” but he chose to mark the omitted answer (the thirteen-page passage) by leaving a textual scar. What remains of the whole episode is the mere promise of its telling (“I’ll tell you”), and the epanorthosis “No, I’ll tell you nothing” (140).

This “textual undoing” (Richardson 2001, 169) can be located on the mild side of Richardson’s continuum as a local instance of denarration, which does not seriously challenge the stability of the storyworld. A bit further toward the middle of the continuum, we can situate the naming and unnamning of M-characters.

**Malone meurt and “M - ?”: from Dis- to Denarration**

The first-person narrator in *Malone meurt* refers to himself as “Malone (since that is what I am called now)” (49). In the manuscript, he originally did not have a name yet, only an initial: M, followed by a dash and a question mark (1947-48, 7.4, 29r). In his capacity as narrator, he starts telling stories about Sapo, until he decides to rename this character. This decision is marked by an epanorthosis: “Car Sapo – non, je ne peux plus l’appeler ainsi” (90), “For Sapo – no, I can’t call him that any more” (56). In the manuscript of *Malone meurt*, the replacement of Sapo by Macmann is marked by a gap. When Beckett decided to make Malone replace Sapo’s name by another one, he did not yet have a name in mind, only its initial: M. Between these two passages, the narrator indicates that he is narrating himself (“Et si je me raconte”) and then the other (“et puis l’autre”), whom he refers to as a homunculus (Beckett 1951b, 84), suggesting that the Cartesian homunculus model of the mind is just another story among the “streams of narrative” that constitute the narrative self or what Damasio terms the...
“autobiographical self.” The “me” in the French original can be read both as an indirect object (as in “je me raconte une histoire”) and as a direct object, in the sense that the narrator is narrating a “me.”

If the “I” can narrate himself (“me” or “M…”), this implies that the narrated self can also just as easily be undone or “denarrated” again. In a narratological context, this “play between narrative creation and destruction” draws attention to the “ontological fragility of the status of much fictional discourse – at any point, the narrator can contradict what has been written, and thereby transform the entire relation between events as well as the way they are interpreted” (Richardson 2006, 94). What may be a narrative situation to be avoided in traditional fiction becomes – in the context of cognitive sciences – a strategy to “denarrate” the homunculus model. **Malone meurt**, with its metafictional elements such as the fallen pencil interrupting and breaking off the narrative, contains several hints at an alternative cognitive model that shows some correspondences with Dennett’s Multiple Drafts Model. But whereas **Malone meurt** may still suggest that the “streams of narrative” (Dennett, 418) issue forth “from one mouth, or one pencil or pen” (418), Dennett’s “center of narrative gravity” suggests that the narratives issue forth “as if from a single source” (418; Dennett’s emphasis). This important difference marks the transition from Malone meurt to **L’Innommable**. In **L’Innommable**, the stories indeed issue forth as if from a single source, but this single “I” is quick to point out that they issue forth from other voices and that the “I” is actually “not I,” since on the opening page of **L’Innommable** the “I” is immediately denarrated: “I, say I. Unbelieving. […] I seem to speak, it is not I, about me, it is not about me” (1).

**L’Innommable and the Man of Glass: Narrating and Denarrating “M”**

As in **Malone meurt**, the manuscript of **L’Innommable** also features a character who is initially referred to by means of an initial M (Beckett 1949-50, 3.10, 20v). Only later does he become “Mahood.” Not unlike Macmann, Mahood has been read in terms of “manhood” (Cohn, 188), but the “M” in **Molloy**, **Malone meurt** and **L’Innommable** can also be read in terms of an inquiry into the human mind. One of the interfactual tools Beckett used for his inquiry was a book by Thomas Reid, called *Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense* (published in 1764). Beckett excerpted a sentence from Reid’s introduction in the first of the two notebooks that constitute the manuscript of **L’Innommable** (inside back cover): “A man that disbeliefes his own existence, is surely as unfit to be reasoned with as a man that believes he is made of glass” (Reid, 100).

In Beckett’s notebook, this passage is written just underneath a reference to Bacon’s *Novum Organon*, “De nobis ipsis silemus,” which Beckett had found in Ernst Cassirer’s introduction to the complete works of Immanuel Kant. In **L’Innommable**, Beckett shows how impossible the motto “De nobis ipsis silemus” is if the self (*ipse*) is the result of stories whose aim is “to encourage [any audience] to (try to) posit a unified agent” from whom they issue forth (Dennett, 418).

As to why Beckett chose the passage on the man who believes he is made of glass, my hypothesis is that there may be a connection with the man who believes he is made of glass, my hypothesis is that there may be a connection with another loose jotting on the same page (inside back cover), preparing the narrator’s intuition that he has been talking enough about himself, enough about “je” and “me.” The note corresponds with the passage “Puis assez de cette putain de première personne” (1953, 93-4), “But enough of this cursed first person” (Beckett 2010c, 56), and with the suggestion that “any old pronoun will do, provided one sees through it” (57; emphasis added), conjuring up the same image of transparency as the “man that believes he is made of glass.”

Beckett’s reading of the *Inquiry into the Human Mind* while he was working on **L’Innommable** is interesting because of Reid’s anti-Cartesian perspective on consciousness and cognition. But although Beckett’s view on the human mind may question the Cartesian model, it is not a Reidian commonsense approach either, and instead of a dismissive metaphor (from Reid’s point of view) the image of the man of glass became the mascot of the dis- or unbelieving attitude of the “I” in The Unnamable: “I, say I. Unbelieving.”

This constant process of narrating and denarrating that results in the perception of an “I” has a genetic dimension that can be illustrated by means of the ending of the novel. In the first of the two notebooks constituting the manuscript of **L’Innommable**, two separate leaves have been pasted in between the last page and the flyleaf. The passage on these two inserted pages, starting with “Ma voix.”
Conclusion

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Narration, disnarration and denarration are forms of proceeding “by affirmations or negations invalidated as uttered” (Beckett 2010c, 1). In Molloy, Malone meurt / Malone Dies and L’Innommable / The Unnamable, Beckett developed this technique along the lines of the principle “Here form is content, content is form” (1984, 27), suggesting a direct link between the form of the narrative as a dialectic of narration and denarration, and the content: consciousness as a constant “editorial process” of “streams of narrative” – in Dennett’s terms. By denarrating the end as a way of continuing, Beckett deployed a narrative strategy that emphasizes “the ontological destabilization always possible in fiction” (Richardson 2006, 94). Moreover, what Richardson refers to as “the performative aspect of world making in narrative fiction” is perhaps not limited to fiction if consciousness indeed works the way Dennett suggests. If telling stories is an evolutionary survival strategy (Dennett, 418), the denarration of these stories turns out to be an equally necessary component in this survival as their narration: “The search for the means to put an end to things, an end to speech, is what enables the discourse to continue” (Beckett 2010c, 10).

Notes

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3. For a more detailed description, see Van Hulle and Nixon 2013, 181-83.

4. See also Marco Bernini’s essay in this volume. Dennett presents Descartes’s idea that consciousness takes place in the pineal gland as a theater in which a homunculus processes the incoming data. The problem with the “Cartesian theater” (Dennett, 107) is that this “internus homo” (Beckett 2010a, 32) would in his turn need a consciousness, i.e., another homunculus, who in his turn would need an even smaller homunculus, resulting in a process of infinite and infinitesimal regress.

5. Antonio Damasio suggests that “Within the narrative of the moment, [the protoself] must protagonize” as a result of “its moment-to-moment engagement as caused by any object being perceived” (202; Damasio’s emphasis). In this context, Damasio stresses that “the protoself is not to be confused with a homunculus” for “The well-identified problem with the homunculus resides with the infinite regress it creates” (201). Regarding the coordinating structures, necessary to construct the “autobiographical self,” Damasio insists that they “are not Cartesian theaters”: “They are not interpreter homunculi” (214).

6. Thomas Reid was the founder of the so-called Scottish School of Common Sense.

7. In the French version (“Dire je. Sans le penser”), the link with Descartes’ “Je pense donc je suis” is more direct than the English version, which refers to the Cartesian cogito via Reid’s anti-Cartesian criticism.


10. See Arthur Rose’s essay in this volume.

Works Cited

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