



DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT

WHEN DOES GLOBALIZATION LEAD TO LOCAL ADAPTATION?

THE EMERGENCE OF HYBRID ISLAMIC SCHOOLS IN TURKEY, 1985-2007

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# **When does globalization lead to local adaptation?**

**The emergence of hybrid Islamic schools in Turkey, 1985-2007**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Neo-institutionalist perspectives of globalization envision the homogenization of the world through global cultural, economic and political dynamics, while glocalization theory highlights how local cultures may adapt or resist global forces. Based on these theories, we analyze when, where, and why local hybrid organizational forms do emerge as a reaction to globalization. We suggest that the impact of globalization on the emergence and expansion of hybrid organizational forms, which reflect local adaptations of global forms, depend on three types of moderators: the experience of the local community with alternative organizational forms, the motivation of the local community to adapt, and, finally, the fit between global and local ideas, values and practices. We test our hypotheses with data of the high school education system in Turkey from 1990 to 2007, a period in which Turkey experienced a growing impact of globalization.

## **INTRODUCTION**

Globalization is often regarded as a formidable blending force blurring boundaries between different cultures resulting in massive institutional and cultural homogenization (Robertson and Khonder, 1998). Although globalization has a number of different dimensions and meanings, the diffusion of cultural models and ideas are a central feature of globalization (Meyer, 2000; Kern, 2010). There seems to be little dispute about the fact that “in many areas of social life, common models organized in world discourse arise and penetrate social life worldwide” (Meyer, 2000: 234). At the same time, however, a paradox emerges as this process goes hand in hand with the growing importance of the particularities of local communities in shaping local cultural adaptations (Marquis and Battilana, 2009). As a result, more recent accounts of the globalization process underscore the dialectical tension between the global and the local. Increasing global interdependence is not only a boundary-blurring force, but might also demarcate boundaries between the global and the local even more sharply – for instance, when globalization represents a threat to local traditions (Marquis and Battilana, 2009: 284).

Clearly, globalization is a very complex process involving the simultaneous operation of global blending and local segregating forces. In other words, it is about “the interpenetration of sameness and difference – or in somewhat different terms, the interpenetration of universalism and particularism.” (Robertson and Khonder, 1998: 28). Globalization does not equate to Westernization because “clashes, conflicts, tensions and so on constitute a pivotal feature of ... the constitution of the world as a single place” (Robertson and Khonder, 1998: 29). The implication is that different versions of

modernity might emerge depending on the specific interplay between the global and the local. In this interplay between the global and local, formal organizations play a key role.

An understudied issue, however, is how globalization affects the local emergence of new organizational forms. This is an important omission given that organizations are major carriers of ideology, playing an important role in the diffusion of values and ideas. Building on theories of globalization and organizational ecology, we develop the argument that globalization opens up opportunities for the emergence of new hybrid organizational forms that combine the templates and values of different parent forms as a way to adjust to environmental uncertainty and episodic change (Minkoff, 2002). According to organizational ecology, the boundaries of different organizational forms are determined by the balance between segregating and blending mechanisms (Hannan and Freeman, 1989: 60). If segregating mechanisms dominate, discontinuities are sharp and organizational forms display sharp and stable differences. However, if blending mechanisms are strong, distinctions among forms are relatively arbitrary and easily bridged, and thus opportunities for hybrid forms are created (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Haveman and Rao, 2006). As globalization acts as a blending mechanism triggering institutional convergence across the globe, our baseline expectation is that globalization goes hand in hand with the emergence and expansion of hybrid organizational forms.

However, local conditions play an important role in this process. As the word ‘glocal’ implies, the impact of globalization depends on the interpenetration of global forces and local responses (Robertson and Khonder, 1998). An important question then is to explain which local-level moderators block or ease the adaptation process in order to understand the dynamics of institutional change (Marquis and Battilana, 2009). In order

to explain the particularities that moderate the impact of globalization on the emergence of hybrid organizational forms, we propose a general model by building on organizational ecology, institutional, and social movement theories. Specifically, in this paper, we argue that whether universalism is blended with local particularism resulting in the proliferation of specific hybrid organizational forms at the local level depends on three different types of local characteristics: 1) the availability of the parent form templates in local communities (institutional repertoire) (Schneiberg, 2007; Minkoff, 1994, 2002); 2) the presence of local mobilizing forces to overcome the obstacles of hybrid form emergence (mobilizing force) (Hasenfeld and Gidron, 2005); and 3) the resonance of universal values with local traditions (cultural fit) (Kern, 2010). We choose these three different types of local-level moderators as scholars assume that they play a key role in affecting the outcomes of the globalization process (Marquis and Battilana, 2009).

This general model is translated to and tested in the context of the Turkish high school system for the period 1985 to 2007. Education is an interesting setting as educational systems experience strong homogenizing pressures due to globalization (Meyer et al., 1997). Turkey is an interesting case study because there is a strong tension between global (Western version of modernism) and local Islamic traditions, which is fueled by local religious polarization and secular-Islamic contestation. Moreover, there is a growing number of so-called Anatolian Imam Hatip schools. These schools can be regarded as a hybrid school form because they combine the curricula of two other school forms: Anatolian and Imam Hatip high schools. The former can be identified as cosmopolitan schools as their educational curriculum embodies secularist and Western-

oriented values, while the latter are traditional religious high schools (Boone et al., 2011). Anatolian Imam Hatip schools are religious high schools, which also provide Western type of education in foreign languages. Because there is considerable geographic heterogeneity in Turkey, we can study how the interplay between universalism (the extent of globalization at the level of Turkey) and different local (district-level) particularistic characteristics affect the founding rate of hybrid schools (Anatolian Imam Hatip schools) at the district level.

## **GENERAL MODEL**

### **Globalization**

According to Hannan and Freeman (1989), the boundaries of different forms are determined by segregating and blending mechanisms because continuity among populations depends on the relative strength of the opposing processes (Hannan and Freeman, 1989: 60). In this sense, the balance between segregating and blending mechanisms determines organizational boundaries. While segregating mechanisms separate organizations into distinct forms by reifying differences, blending mechanisms blur distinctions between organizational forms by reifying similarities (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Haveman and Rao, 2006). If blending mechanisms are strong, distinctions among forms are relatively arbitrary and easily bridged, and thus opportunities for hybrid forms are created (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Haveman and Rao, 2006). Hybrid organizations are organizational forms that combine the institutional logics that are materialized in two or more “pure” organizational forms (Haveman and Rao, 2006). As globalization acts as a blending mechanism and triggers institutional



convergence across the globe, our aim is to analyze the impact of globalization on the emergence and expansion of hybrid organizational forms.

According to institutional theory, globalization acts as a blending force by spreading cosmopolitan values, practices and institutions through isomorphic processes (Boli and Thomas, 1999; Meyer et al., 1997). States derive much of their structure and authority from being embedded in a global world, which consists of common legitimating models (Meyer et al., 1997). “Instead of a central actor, the culture of world society allocates responsible and authoritative actorhood to nation-states” (Meyer et al., 1997: 169). Therefore, globalization provides the necessary templates for nation-states and, hence, affects the evolution of organizational forms. Following this argument, we propose that globalization spurs local communities to adapt by adopting hybrid organizational forms that blend the global with the local.

However, the particularities at the local level act as a segregating mechanism that reifies the differences of the local community with respect to the rest of the world (Haveman and Rao, 2006: 977). By analyzing the effect of local characteristics, we can have a better understanding of isomorphism and change dynamics in the light of globalization processes (Marquis and Battilana, 2009). We claim that the interaction of globalization and local characteristics lead to the emergence of hybrid organizational forms under certain conditions. In our framework, hybrid organizational forms refer to the local adaptations when local communities face the impact of globalization. The extent to which local adaptations emerge depends on three classes of moderators (see Figure 1).

[Insert Figure 1 about here]

## **Local-level moderators**

### *Institutional repertoire*

First, we argue that the institutional repertoire of a local community positively moderates the impact of globalization on the emergence of hybrid organizational forms by providing the necessary institutional building blocks and templates for hybrid organizational forms (Haveman and Rao, 2006). According to organizational ecology, variation, selection and retention dynamics result in the growth of new organizational forms adapted to a specific environmental niche. Regulative pressures vary across communities and provide examples of such variation (Marquis and Battilana, 2009). Organizational variations provide the raw material for selection processes (Baum, 2000). For hybrid organizational forms to emerge, organizational variations are necessary. By the very hybrid nature of these new forms, their development is based upon the recombination of form elements already present in organizational populations. Therefore, variation is necessary for the emergence of hybrid organizational forms.

Second, previously founded organizations in a local community constitute resources or building blocks for alternative organizational forms. Established institutional paths contain the possibilities and resources within them for transformation (Schneiberg, 2007). If the local community has had experience with different organizational forms, this experience provides communities with resources for institutional recombination or redeployment (Schneiberg, 2007). Existing organizational forms constrain and enable mobilization, and shape the capacity of new organizational forms to produce change (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2008).

Finally, as hybrid forms blend population boundaries, they face obstacles to build up their legitimacy and obtain resources (Minkoff, 2002). However, as local communities have different frames of reference and corresponding standards of legitimacy (Marquis and Battilana, 2009), previously founded organizations in a local community denote these standards of legitimacy. In this sense, the relationship between the established organizational forms and the newly emergent ones (that are differentiated by some aspects in comparison to the established forms – as is the case for hybrid organizational forms) can be mutualistic (Dobrev, Ozdemir, and Teo, 2006). The newly emerging organizational form benefits from the legitimacy of the established organizations if it falls into a cognitive category that is easily recognizable by the audience (Dobrev et al., 2006). Therefore, hybrid forms may overcome the legitimacy obstacles by building on the legitimacy of established forms and taking advantage of their resources while incorporating some innovations (Minkoff, 1994; Minkoff, 2002). Following this argument, we claim that if the local community has experience with the parent organizational forms, then that will positively moderate the impact of globalization on the emergence of hybrid forms.

#### *Mobilizing force*

Even though the institutional repertoire positively moderates the impact of globalization on the emergence of hybrid organizational forms, the legitimacy of established organizational forms may also work against organizations with forms that differ from the accepted templates (Haveman and Rao, 2006). Hybrid organizational forms can meet sharp punishment because of blurring the boundaries of collectively agreed organizational forms (Kovacs and Hannan, 2010; Hannan 2010; Hsu, Hannan, and

Kocak, 2009; Rao, Monin, and Durand, 2005). Particularly, the punishment gets stronger if the category codes are oppositional or involve moral imperatives (Kovacs and Hannan, 2010). Therefore, organizations that conform to the established categories are easier for the audience to identify, enhancing their legitimacy (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll, 2007). In this sense, building hybrid organizational forms and their acceptance does need resources, motivation, and energy of the local community. Such mobilization of commitment and resource mobilization requires community engagement in order to achieve social change (Benson, 1977).

Different forms of social mobilization may arise in different communities depending on specific issues. Given that achieving social change is the key for the concept of social mobilization (Deutsch, 1961), its significant component is the mobilization of participants to pursue their interests and reach out for alternative structural arrangements (Benson, 1977). Occupational, racial, religious or social groups and classes may plan alternatives, and may become actively committed to their achievement (Benson, 1977).

Foundings of hybrid organizational forms provide a good example of such an alternative structural arrangement given the impact of globalization. The presence of a mobilizing force spurs local communities to spend their energy and resources on developing hybrid organizational forms (Hasenfeld and Gidron, 2005; Kurzman, 1998). Therefore, we claim that presence of a mobilizing force moderates the impact of globalization on the emergence of hybrid organizational forms.

### *Cultural fit*

One of the consequences of the globalization process is the development of a broad world polity of shared rules and models (Meyer, 2000). Even though these shared rules and models rest on a common rationale, there are still variations and conflicts between different global actors (global actors can be states, organizations, or individuals) (Meyer, 2000). Because global actors rely on the wider models for legitimation, these conflicts, differences or variations among models of modernity become the source of global conflict (Meyer, 2000). In other words, despite the rationality of legitimated world models, culture and cognition differ based on localities (Marquis and Battilana, 2009), and these differences play a role on the emergence of alternative modernities and, hence, global conflicts (Meyer, 2000).

We argue that given these cultural and cognitive differences at the local level, there needs to be resonance between the local and global cultures for the acceptance of global norms, values and practices. Depending on the extent of cultural resonance, local communities adapt to the global practices. Particularly, the interaction of global institutions, values and norms with their local counterparts results in a 'hybrid' set of values and norms under certain conditions (Kern, 2010). This can be defined as a translation/adaptation process that involves the combination of locally available principles and practices together with the new global principles and practices (Kern, 2010; Campbell, 2004). The persuasiveness of new ideas and values will increase if they are compatible with the existing ones; if they provide answers and solutions to individual problems; and if they resonate well with culturally rooted narratives and myths (Kern, 2010). If there is resonance between global and local cultures, it will increase the appeal

of the global one by making it appear natural and familiar (Gamson, 1992). Therefore, hybrid forms are expected to emerge as the resonance between global ideas and local identities increases.

## **GLOBALIZATION, EDUCATION AND TURKEY**

### **Blending and segregating forces in Turkey**

The globalization process of Turkey began with the financial liberalization policies in 1980. The integration of the Turkish economy into the global economy was not limited to government policies, but also initiated through structural adjustment programs organized by the IMF and World Bank (Cizre and Yeldan, 2005). After the 1980 military coup, Turgut Ozal, the 19<sup>th</sup> prime minister of Turkey, introduced a series of transformative policies paving the way for economic liberalization, as well as the re-establishment of parliamentary democracy. The aim of the economic policies of this period was shifting to a liberal and market-oriented strategy instead of a protectionist and import-substitution approach (Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr, 1993). The reason behind this radical shift was the fact that the Turkish economy had been suffering from structural constraints to growth for some years, and the solution introduced by the liberal government was the integration of the Turkish economy into the world capitalist system (Ardic, 2009). As a result of the liberalization policies, Turkey developed economic relationships with many countries, gaining access to export markets. However, rapid development required large capital imports because domestic savings were insufficient for needed investments. In this period, foreign investors were attracted by Turkey's great economic potential and

increasingly liberal economic policies. As a result, the amount of foreign capital invested in Turkey increased rapidly (Ardic, 2009).

The globalization process that began with Turkey's integration into global capitalism also had political and social consequences. First, the political relations of Turkey with other countries improved through increasing trade relations and foreign direct investments. Second, as a consequence of economic development and advanced communication technologies, global connectivity and global consciousness increased. The most prominent reflections of the global culture in Turkey can be seen in the patterns of consumption and thus in the style of life (Helvacioğlu, 2000). The global cultural ideas and practices began to spread by means of mass media. In this sense, globalization acted as a blending mechanism by blurring the distinctions between Turkey and the rest of the world. This was a result of the increasing interconnectedness of the country with global values, norms and practices.

Even though globalization acted as a blending mechanism by reifying similarities in Turkey, there are still particularities at the local level and that create a tension between the global and local. The main segregating force that operates at the local level is the polarization between secular and religious factions in Turkey. Religious polarization was already present in Turkish society, creating competition between religious and secular factions, before Turkey experienced the impact of globalization. However, it has sharpened over the last decades. The main contentions between the secular and religious factions are about the role of religion in public life, and the relationship between national identity and Islam. According to the religious faction, the state should not be in control of religion (Sakallıoğlu, 1996). They want to express their religious beliefs and life style

freely. However, the secular faction has always seen religion as a threat to the secular state and the secular life style (Sakallioglu, 1996). One of the recent discussions that demonstrate the religious polarization in Turkey is about wearing headscarves in the public sphere. The aim of the secular faction has been to exclude religious symbols from the public sphere in order to avert any religious threat to the secular state; however, for the religious faction, this is a restriction on human rights.

With increasing globalization, and particularly with the introduction of neoliberal policies, competition also became about different forms of modernism. The religious faction criticized “the status of the secular-rational thinking as the exclusive source of modernity in Turkey” (Keyman and Koyuncu, 2005: 110). For more conservative and religious people the coexistence between globalization and religion was possible (Ozbudun and Keyman, 2002). Moreover, as a consequence of neoliberal economic policies during this period, many religiously conservative cities, such as Denizli, Konya and Kayseri, started to develop, too. Starting with the “Ozal period”, small and medium-sized enterprises in those cities have formed a new business community by improving their business practices (Demir, Acar, and Toprak, 2004). The liberalization policies have triggered increased economic productivity and capital accumulation in Anatolia. The emergence of the ‘Anatolian tigers’<sup>1</sup> contributed to the wealth of the relatively religious and conservative faction residing in Anatolia.

For the religious faction, this alternative modernity can be defined as a religious/modern synthesis. The result of this synthesis was the emergence of a “devout bourgeoisie class” that uses modern methods of business, and demands more political

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<sup>1</sup> The term “Anatolian tigers” refers to the phenomenon of a number of cities in Turkey which have displayed impressive growth records since the 1980s.



freedom yet wants to realize this without losing its religious identity (Demir et al., 2004). The emergence of a devout bourgeoisie class also reflected itself institutionally, such as in the foundations of new school forms, business associations and social movements. Some of the prominent examples from this period are the emergence of Islamic banks (interest-free banking) and the emergence of MUSIAD (“Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association” – a business association of religiously conservative businessmen from Anatolia). All these processes increased the tension and competition between the secular elites and the devout bourgeoisie even further.

### **Globalization and the Turkish high school system**

The expansion of a global standardized education model, and hence isomorphism in the education system, is a very well-established and analyzed topic in the literature. Global processes have been affecting education systems all over the world through discourses on human capital, economic development, multiculturalism, intergovernmental organizations, and information and communication technology (Dale and Robertson, 2003; Spring, 2008). The reasons behind these globalization discourses are explained with reference to the influence of the US, emerging democratization processes, and the impact of the worldwide emphasis on human rights (Meyer, Bromley, and Ramirez, 2010; Schofer and Meyer, 2005). According to the neo-institutionalist perspective, the expansion of a global model of schooling is actually part of a more general diffusion of the modern nation-state, particularly after World War II (Meyer et al., 1997). As a part of the general diffusion of the modern nation-state, education systems around the world are becoming more and more similar over time.

One of the worldwide trends in education is that national laws make schooling compulsory (Ramirez and Ventresca, 1992). Since 1910, most countries have established a central education authority (Ramirez and Ventresca, 1992). Another component of the global model of education is the rapid increase in enrolment rates in all types of countries (Meyer et al., 1997). Finally, the neo-institutional perspective suggests that the curricular content is institutionalized at the world level (Kamens, Meyer, and Benavot, 1996). These globalization forces had a profound impact on the Turkish education system, too. Both secular and Islamic factions tried to strategically use the education system to push their preferred ideology. Different factions in the community demand school forms that fit with their own ideology. Particularly the high school system has been an important arena, being the cradle for the future elite.

Traditionally, there are three types of high schools that prepare students for higher education in Turkey: regular high schools, Anatolian (cosmopolitan) high schools (these are both secular high schools), and Imam Hatip high schools.<sup>2</sup> Regular high schools are the dominant type in Turkey. These are the basic high schools that do not require any entrance exam. However, Anatolian high schools admit their students based on the nationwide high school entrance score, and they give education in foreign languages. In addition, Anatolian high schools provide higher quality education, and their curriculum embodies secularist and Western-oriented values. The first cosmopolitan high schools were established as alternatives to international high schools that provided high-quality and foreign language education in Turkey. In the meantime, as the impact of globalization intensified, these schools became more and more popular among the secular

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<sup>2</sup> There are also private high schools in Turkey. However, in this paper, we focus on the public high schools that do not require any tuition fees. Private schools constituted only one per cent of all high schools in Turkey as of 2007 (National Education statistics published by Turkish Ministry of National Education).

faction. The main reason is that these schools do not force any type of religion on the students whilst at the same time giving high-quality education and teaching foreign languages, which is seen as a first step for a student to become connected with the rest of the world.

At the other side of the ideological spectrum, there are Imam Hatip schools that offer religious education. Even though Imam Hatip schools were founded to educate imams and preachers, due to the resurgence of Islam that began in the 1950s, Imam Hatip schools have become regular educational institutions after a series of regulatory changes (Pak, 2004). The main characteristic of these schools is that they provide vocational courses as well as standard arts and science classes. As might be expected, Imam Hatip schools are preferred by religious parents who want their children to be religiously educated, next to and on top of standard schooling, while Anatolian schools are preferred by parents who want their children to be educated in line with secular/cosmopolitan norms (Pak, 2004).

In 1985, a new school form emerged in the Turkish education system: Anatolian Imam Hatip schools. As suggested by the label, they are a combination of the Anatolian and Imam Hatip high schools. The main characteristic of Anatolian Imam Hatip schools is that they combine the curricula of Anatolian schools with Imam Hatip-inspired religious education (Pak, 2004). In this sense, Anatolian Imam Hatip schools can be seen as a hybrid school forms. The Anatolian high schools embody cosmopolitan education, but do not provide any form of religious education. The Imam Hatip high schools include religious education in addition to the standard arts and science classes, but do not attempt to educate their students to be world citizens. For the newly emerged devout bourgeoisie

class, the question was which type of education they wanted their children to have. Hybrid schools became a good option because they include religious education and provide good-quality education in foreign languages, allowing their children to connect with the rest of the world. Compared to Anatolian schools, Anatolian, Imam Hatip schools have the same foreign language course load as Anatolian schools, exceeding that of Imam Hatip schools. However, unlike Anatolian schools, the curriculum of Anatolian Imam Hatip School includes vocational courses such as Arabic, theology, and holy Qur'an besides the standard courses such as mathematics, and natural sciences (Turkish Ministry of Education, General Directorate of Religious Education).

Together with the intensification of the impact of globalization, the number of Anatolian Imam Hatip schools increased rapidly. Figures 2 and 3 provide the densities of the different school forms. As can be seen from the figures, the dominant high school type in Turkey is the regular high school. In 2007, 55 per cent of all public high schools of the regular type, down from 72 per cent in 1985. In the periphery of regular high schools, the most prominent school types include Anatolian (5% in 1985 and 25% in 2007), Imam Hatip (23% in 1985 and 14% in 2007), and Anatolian Imam Hatip high schools (only 1 school in 1985 and 6% in 2007). The relative importance of both Anatolian and Anatolian Imam Hatip schools substantially increased over time (also witnessed by their growing densities), at the expense of the dominant regular schools and the traditional Imam Hatip schools (which growth seems to stagnate). These developments are presumably the result of the increasing impact of globalization. Figure 3 exhibits the growing popularity of Anatolian Imam Hatip schools among the religious faction.

[Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here]

Before elaborating specific hypotheses, it is important to explain the school founding procedure in Turkey. On the one hand, it is a top-down process in the sense that the Turkish Ministry of Education makes the final decisions about the location, number, and the type of school foundings. There are some requirements that a specific local district needs to adhere to in order to assure the efficiency of the school such as number of students at the local district (Turkish Ministry of Education, Principles regarding school openings and closure<sup>3</sup>). On the other hand, it is a bottom-up process, because the local community can request a certain type of school in their district by bearding to the corresponding governor, who in turn transmits this request to the Ministry of Education. Moreover, if the local community donates the necessary buildings and equipments to the state for a certain type of school, then the requirements do not necessarily need to hold (Turkish Ministry of Education). In that case, the government gives permission for the founding of the requested school in that district, and assigns teaching staff. Even without any donation from the local community, the government takes into account the needs and demands of that local district. Therefore, the founding process of schools in Turkey can be regarded as both a top-down and bottom-up process, implying that local conditions and local collective action are important drivers of new school formation.

## **HYPOTHESES**

Despite the impact of globalization and the convergence of education systems, schools are still one of the most important vehicles for nation building (Saito, 2011). As a result of the increasing impact of globalization, nation-states face a dilemma in terms of which

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<sup>3</sup> [http://www.meb.gov.tr/duyurular/duyurular2010/mub/kurum\\_acilmasina\\_iliskin\\_esaslar.pdf](http://www.meb.gov.tr/duyurular/duyurular2010/mub/kurum_acilmasina_iliskin_esaslar.pdf).

institutional logic to adopt. The resolution for this contradiction for national education systems is to reproduce the existing institutional arrangements by blending these institutional logics (Marquis and Battilana, 2009). One way to do so is by adding a few elements taken from another organizational form to the existing organizations and having piecemeal adaptations instead of a radical institutional change (Haveman and Rao, 2006). For the education system, this means having a hybrid form that includes both global and local institutional logics by blending those.

In Turkey, the number of Imam Hatip high schools increased rapidly, particularly in the 1950s because of the demand for religious education. As discussed above, the globalization wave began to be influential in Turkey in the 1980s (Cizre and Yeldan, 2005). As a result of this process, global norms, values and practices began to spread to all spheres of life, including the education system (Meyer et al., 1997). Therefore, the education given in Imam Hatip schools began falling short. Particularly for the newly emerging devout bourgeoisie, religious education had to be redefined as a vehicle not only for infusing religious norms, but also for helping their children to acquire competencies and values required to be a world citizen (Saito, 2011). With the increasing impact of globalization and the associated increasing importance of cosmopolitan norms, values and practices, competition between religious and secular factions got even more intense. Particularly, in order to be part of the future elite in a globalizing world, it was no longer enough to have a standard education combined with religious courses. The implication of this transformation for Islamic education was blending these institutional logics by adopting a cosmopolitan template alongside traditional religion-inspired practices. Hence, globalization triggered Imam Hatip schools to combine their curricula

with those of the Anatolian schools, resulting in the emergence and expansion of the hybrid school form (Anatolian Imam Hatip schools) that includes both Islamic and cosmopolitan worldviews. Therefore, we expect that the hybrid school founding rate at the district level increases with the extent of globalization of Turkey.

*Hypothesis 1: The district-level founding rate of hybrid schools (Anatolian Imam Hatip schools) increases with globalization.*

### **Institutional repertoire**

The curriculum of Anatolian Imam Hatip schools keeps the core religious course load of Imam Hatip schools, and combines this with the curriculum of Anatolian schools. Anatolian Imam Hatip schools not only integrate the curricula of Imam Hatip and Anatolian schools into a hybrid one, but also blend their names literally as Anatolian Imam Hatip schools. As a result, in districts in which both parent forms are firmly established people, will not be unfamiliar with the new emerging hybrid form. The presence of parent form schools in a local district provides the necessary variations (Haveman and Rao, 2006; Baum, 2000), building blocks and resources to the local community for institutional recombination, which facilitates the emergence of hybrid schools (Schneiberg, 2007).

As the main characteristic of Anatolian high schools is education in foreign languages and that of Imam Hatip schools religious education, the label “Anatolian Imam Hatip” high school clearly signals that hybrid schools provide religious education and high-quality education in foreign languages. Moreover, Anatolian Imam Hatip schools accept their students based on the same nationwide high school entrance exam as

Anatolian schools (Turkish Ministry of Education, Anatolian High School Legislation). Therefore, in local districts in which there were already Anatolian high schools and Imam Hatip high schools, the Anatolian Imam Hatip School was not a totally new school form. Instead, the hybrid form could benefit from the legitimacy of both parent forms (Dobrev, Ozdemir, and Teo, 2006; Minkoff, 1994; Minkoff, 2002). Therefore, we predict that the presence of parent school forms – namely, Imam Hatip and Anatolian schools – will positively affect the emergence and expansion of hybrid school forms when globalization rises.

***Hypothesis 2:** The positive impact of globalization on the district-level founding rate of hybrid schools (Anatolian Imam Hatip schools) increases with the density of parent school forms (Anatolian schools and Imam Hatip schools) in a local community.*

### **Mobilization force**

As carriers of ideologies, schools are affected by the distribution of different ideologies in society. Each sub-group representing these ideologies demands a specific form of schooling that fits with their ideology. In addition, schools have strategic importance for decision-makers, since education is a state instrument to influence the relationship of the individual to the state or polity (Nielsen and Hannan, 1977). So the demand and supply of specific types of schooling is driven by the prevailing ideologies in society and private actors trying to influence political elites via social movements in order to obtain schooling that fits with their ideology (Güven, 2005; Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996). Therefore, the distribution of ideologies in a society is the major driving force behind the expansion of different school forms (Boone et al., 2011).



As discussed earlier, since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the major ideological contention between secular and religious factions has been about the role of religion in public life. The ideological/religious polarization mobilized the participants of each faction for structural arrangements against each other in order to compete (Benson, 1977). As a result, the number of Imam Hatip schools increased particularly in the 1950s due to the increasing influence of political Islam in Turkey. At the same time, the growing influence of political Islam triggered action from secular counter-movements with a strong demand for educational expansion of the secular/cosmopolitan high school type (Güven, 2005; Heper and Güney, 2000). Therefore, both forms stimulated each other's growth rate as a result of a sequence of movements and counter-movements (Boone et al., 2011).

However, with the emergence of a devout bourgeoisie class, which presents a religious/modern synthesis as an alternative modernity, cosmopolitan education gained strategic importance for the religious population as well. In order to be connected with the rest of the world and to be part of the elite as a global actor (Meyer, 2000), religious education had to compete on similar grounds with the secular/cosmopolitan schools by establishing hybrid school forms. Hence, with the increasing impact of globalization, the nature of the competition between secular and religious factions gained a new dimension: adapting to global values, norms and practices. As building hybrid schools requires energy, resources, and commitment (Benson, 1977), ideological/religious polarization acted as a mobilizing force for the religious faction to reach out for an alternative structural arrangement to keep up competition with the secular faction. Then, for the religious faction, blending religious with cosmopolitan education became necessary.

Therefore, the necessity to compete with the secularists for elite functions spurs the emergence and expansion of hybrid organizational forms (Hasenfeld and Gidron, 2005). If the polarization/ideological contention is higher in a local district, the motivation of the religious faction will be larger to blend religious and cosmopolitan identities.

***Hypothesis 3:** The positive impact of globalization on the district-level founding rate of hybrid schools (Anatolian Imam Hatip schools) increases with religious-secular polarization in a local community.*

### **Cultural fit**

As discussed above, depending on the extent of cultural resonance, local communities may or may not adapt to global values, norms and practices. Until the 1980s, secularists acted as the guardians of secular values and modernism (Sakallioglu, 1994). However, the increasing impact of globalization resulted in the emergence of a devout bourgeoisie class. This newly emerging social class embraced globalization while keeping their religious identity. The local emergence of such a religious/modern synthesis is facilitated when there is a cultural fit between the global values, norms and practices with the local/religious ones.

The cultural fit between the global and local can be reflected in different ways. In the Turkish context, we argue that cultural fit will be low when Islamic fundamentalism (as witnessed by voting behavior as to extreme religious parties) in a district is high. The perception and practice of religion is not homogenous in Turkey. Despite the emergence of a devout bourgeoisie class in Turkey, there are still other religious sects that are reluctant to adapt to new values and practices. We claim that if the proportion of extreme

religious votes is relatively high in a district, then people will be more rigid about religious norms, values and practices. Hence, there is not going to much – if any – resonance between the global/cosmopolitan norms, values and ideas and their local Islam-inspired counterparts.

***Hypothesis 4a:** The positive impact of globalization on the district-level founding rate of hybrid schools (Anatolian Imam Hatip schools) decreases with the proportion of extreme religious votes in a local community.*

We also argue that the degree of resonance between global and local values, norms and practices will be high when the local community has a strong entrepreneurial culture (as witnessed by the growth of the number of entrepreneurs). We predict that globalization will spur the adoption of alternative modernities as reflected in hybrid schools in districts with such a culture. Being part of a global world (economic) system is instrumental for entrepreneurs as this is a precondition for the accumulation of capital and wealth. Local entrepreneurs have to operate in a marketplace that is modeled along the lines of practices spread through economic globalization. They are therefore likely to bridge the gap between the local and the global world of economic capitalism.

***Hypothesis 4b:** The positive impact of globalization on the district-level founding rate of hybrid schools (Anatolian Imam Hatip schools) increases with the growth of the number of entrepreneurs in a local community.*

## **DATA AND METHOD**

The dataset covers the period from 1985 to 2007, for 81 districts in Turkey. Following organizational ecology literature, our dependent variable is the founding rate of Anatolian

Imam Hatip high schools at the district level. We counted the number of Anatolian, Imam Hatip, and Anatolian Imam Hatip schools in Turkey at the district level. We start our analysis with the foundation of the first Anatolian Imam Hatip schools. We stop at 2007 because a new regulation in 2008 transformed all regular schools into Anatolian high schools.<sup>4</sup> The data for Imam Hatip high schools and Anatolian high schools are obtained from the National Education Statistics published by the Prime Ministry State Institute of Statistics. The data for Anatolian Imam Hatip high schools are collected through the high school directory and the websites of each Anatolian Imam Hatip high school.

### **Independent variables**

The literature on globalization emphasizes different dimensions. Some stress the economic aspect (Harvey, 1989; Sassen, 1991), some underscore the political dimension (Held, 1998; McGrew, 1997), while other studies claim that the political-economy perspective ignores the cultural dimension of globalization (Ritzer, 1993). Since globalization is a multifaceted concept that cannot be captured fully by a single indicator, we employ the KOF (Konjunkturforschungsstelle) index of globalization that does not exclude any dimension of globalization. This index represents an attempt to measure the extent of globalization of a country in the broad sense, and has been accepted in the recent empirical literature as a valid measure.

The KOF index was presented in 2002 (Dreher, 2006). It covers 123 countries and includes 23 variables. The index covers the economic, political and social dimensions of globalization. Each of these three dimensions has further sub-dimensions. Economic globalization of a country is described by actual economic flows (trade, foreign direct

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<sup>4</sup> The curriculum of regular schools has changed and the weight of foreign language courses has increased.

investment, portfolio investment, and income payments to foreign nationals, each measured as a percentage of GDP) and the absence of restrictions (hidden import barriers, mean tariff rate, taxes on international trade, and capital account restrictions). Political globalization is described by the number of foreign embassies, membership in international organizations, and participation in U.N. Security Council missions. Social globalization covers items such as international tourism, number of internet hosts and users as well as the number of McDonald's restaurants, and the number of IKEA shops (per capita). We use the updated KOF index of globalization for Turkey, which measures globalization on a scale of 1 to 100 each year, and higher numbers indicating more globalization. We employed mean-centered values of the KOF index of globalization for Turkey. The data is obtained from the website of the Swiss Economic Institute.<sup>5</sup>

A number of studies employ the KOF index of globalization in different contexts. Bergh and Nilsson (2010) examine the relationship between the KOF Index of globalization and income inequality by using panel data covering around 80 countries for the period 1970–2005. Chang, Lee and Hsieh (2011) analyze the long-run relationship between real output (real GDP) and the KOF index of globalization by employing annual data of G7 countries from 1970 to 2006. Potrafke (2010) investigates the influence of globalization on various aspects of labor market deregulation by using the KOF Index as a proxy of globalization for 20 OECD countries in the 1982–2003 period. Using panel data of 39 countries over the period 1979-2007, Lee and Chang (2012) analyze the impact of the KOF index of globalization on the development and convergence of international life insurance markets. The aim of Pekarskiene and Susniene (2011) is to assess the level of globalization and the tendencies of its changes in the Baltic countries

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<sup>5</sup> <http://www.kof.ethz.ch/>.

using the KOF globalization index. These studies found empirical support for their predictions, which provides evidence of the validity and reliability of this KOF measure.

Figures 4 and 5 exhibit the KOF index of globalization, its three dimensions, and GDP per capita for Turkey for the period between 1985 and 2007. Figure 4 reveals a strong increase in all globalization indices until 1994, after which they seem to taper off. GDP per capita indicates a different picture, increasing for the whole observation period and even accelerating after 2000 (Figure 5). This suggests that economic growth follows the globalization trend, and that economic development and globalization (as measured by the KOF index) are different measures.

[Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here]

Moreover, we employ variables at the local level in order to analyze the characteristics that moderate the impact of globalization. For the second hypothesis, in our model, we include the interactions of the density of Imam Hatip and Anatolian high schools with the KOF globalization index, as Imam Hatip and Anatolian high schools are the parent forms of the hybrid schools (Anatolian Imam Hatip schools).

For the third hypothesis, we add the interaction of the KOF globalization index and a polarization index. We use the polarization index proposed by Esteban and Ray (1994). This polarization index is based on the Gini coefficient that takes both the size of the sub-groups and the distance<sup>6</sup> between the polarized groups into account:

$$P = k \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \pi_i^{1+\alpha} \pi_j |y_i - y_j|$$

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<sup>6</sup> The measurement of the distance between groups depends on the context. In our case, the distance between the polarized groups refers to the distance in terms of secular-religious orientation of the community at the district level.

in which  $k$  is the scaling factor,  $\pi$  denotes the size of the groups,  $|y_i - y_j|$  gives the distance between groups  $i$  and  $j$ , and  $\alpha$  parametrizes the degree of polarization sensitivity that takes a value between 0 and 1.6 (Esteban and Ray, 1994). We use this index in order to measure the secular-religious polarization of the local community at the district level.

We measure the size of the groups by the outcomes of the parliamentary elections. The distance between the polarized groups refers to the distance in terms of secular-religious orientation of the community at the district level. In order to do that, the political parties are classified on a secular/religious scale ranging from 1 (extremely secular) to 10 (extremely religious). This scaling was done by the first author (of Turkish nationality), and was cross-checked by Turkish political scientists (Appendix A lists all parties that ever participated in elections during our study period and the secular/religious score attached to each party). We set  $k = 1^7$ , and  $\alpha = 0.8$ . By doing so, we follow most researchers by giving a balanced weight to the size of and the distance between the subgroups. We ran robustness analyses with  $\alpha = 0.4$  and  $\alpha = 1.2$ , which produced a pattern of findings similar to what we report below (available upon request).

The independent variable for Hypothesis 4a is the interaction of the KOF globalization index and the percentage of votes that extreme religious parties received at the district level.<sup>8</sup> The independent variable for Hypothesis 4b is the interaction of the KOF globalization index and the growth of the number of employers at the district level (our proxy for the entrepreneurial culture of the district). The growth of the number of employers at the district level is measured as the increase in the number of employers.

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<sup>7</sup> Since  $k$  is a multiplicative constant, it does not have any qualitative effect on the results (Esteban and Ray, 1994)

<sup>8</sup> The extremely religious parties are the ones that take 10 on the secular/religious scale.

The variable is obtained from the National Education Statistics published by the Prime Ministry State Institute of Statistics.

### **Control variables**

Our main control variables consist of the percentage of government expenditures devoted to education at the country level in order to control for carrying capacity. We also controlled for GDP growth at the country level<sup>9</sup> and the (logarithm of) the population at the district level. Another control variable is the density of regular schools. The density of regular schools controls for the general expansion of the high school system in Turkey. We employed the lagged values of these variables in order to avoid simultaneity. For the different official regions in Turkey (being Aegean, Black Sea, Central Anatolia, Eastern Anatolia, Marmara, Mediterranean, Southeastern Anatolia), we included dummies that take 1 if the district is in that region and 0 otherwise. We added a dummy variable to control for the years following a territorial change of a few districts (1 for the years after the change, and 0 otherwise). Finally, at the district level, we controlled for the density of previously founded hybrid schools, and the densities of the parent schools forms (Anatolian and Imam Hatip high schools).<sup>10</sup>

### **Model specification**

As our dependent variable is a count measure, a Poisson process provides a natural baseline for modeling the founding rate of hybrid school forms (Hannan and Freeman,

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<sup>9</sup> We also included real GDP per capita as a control variable (available upon request). We discuss the results in the Findings section.

<sup>10</sup> For the period between 1985 and 1990, a dummy variable was included to control for the low level of foundings of hybrid schools in this period. However, we do not find any significant effect of this dummy. Including this dummy in our models do not change any of our results (available upon request).



1987, 1989). However, Poisson regression should not be applied in cases of overdispersion (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989). Even though overdispersion does not affect the coefficient estimates, it results in underestimated standard errors (Wezel, 2005). In order to deal with this problem, we use negative binomial regression model by adding a stochastic error component, following a gamma distribution, to the model (Cattani, Pennings, and Wezel, 2003; Wezel, 2005). Following Baron et al. (2001), we used Liang and Zeger's (1986) method of generalized estimating equations (GEE). GEE generalizes quasi-likelihood estimation to the panel data context, being a very flexible way to deal with clustered data. We assume an exchangeable autocorrelation structure. By way of robustness check, we also ran the analyses with fixed effect methods. All models are estimated using the XTGEE routine of version 10.0 of STATA.

## **FINDINGS**

Descriptive statistics and correlations between the variables are reported in Table 1. Table 2 provides our GEE negative binomial regression estimates of the foundings of the number of hybrid schools at the district level.

[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here]

We focus first on the effects of globalization and some of the control variables. According to the results in Model 1 in Table 2, globalization spurs the founding rate of hybrid school density, providing support for the first hypothesis ( $B=.09$ ;  $p<.001$ ). In addition, GDP growth and the percentage of educational expenditures (both at the country-level) have a positive impact on hybrid school foundings. There appear to be differences across regions (Marmara being the omitted region) with respect to the

foundings of hybrid schools. Hybrid school foundings are less in eastern, southeastern, and central Anatolia regions. At the district level, district population and extreme religious votes have a positive impact while previous foundings and secular-religious polarization have a negative impact on the emergence of hybrid schools. Density of regular schools does not have any significant effect.

In Model 1 (Table 2), our findings suggest that the densities of Imam Hatip and Anatolian schools both have a positive impact on the emergence of hybrid schools ( $B=.14$  and  $B=.05$ , respectively; for both estimates  $p<.001$ ). In Model 2 (Table 2), we tested our second hypothesis by including the interactions of the densities of Imam Hatip and Anatolian schools with the globalization index and a three-way interaction of these variables. Even though the densities of Imam Hatip and Anatolian schools have a positive main effect on hybrid school foundings, we did not find those densities to moderate the impact of globalization. Therefore we did not find support for Hypothesis 2.

The estimates of Model 3 (Table 2) provide evidence for Hypothesis 3: secular-religious polarization acts as a mobilizing force for rival ideologies and triggers the motivation for local adaptations ( $B=.20$ ;  $p<.001$ ). High religious-secular polarization stimulates competition between religious and secular factions for elite functions, and therefore spurs the emergence and expansion of hybrid high school forms when globalization is high. Figure 6 visualizes this interaction.

[Insert Figure 6 about here]

In Models 4 and 5 (Table 2), we test whether hybrid school form foundings increases as the resonance between new global ideas and local cultural orientations increases. Model 4 (Table 2) provides support for Hypothesis 4a and reveals that the impact of globalization

on hybrid school foundings is attenuated by the proportion of extremely religious votes ( $B=-.002$ ;  $p<.05$ ).<sup>11</sup> A more extreme interpretation of Islam apparently presents a barrier to the local community to adapt to global norms due to lack of resonance between the global and the local. In Model 5 (Table 2), we found support for Hypothesis 4b: the effect of globalization on hybrid school foundings increases with the growth in the number of employers in a local district ( $B=.01$ ;  $p<.05$ ). This finding suggests that adapting to global values, norms and practices by blending the local with the global is instrumental in districts with a strong entrepreneurial climate. Figures 7A and 7B show both interactions.

[Insert Figures 7A and 7B about here]

Finally, to extend our previous finding, we also run a model including the interaction between religious votes and the growth of the number of employers. The results in Model 6 (Table 2) support the idea that the Islamic faction spurs alternative modernities when the community has a strong local entrepreneurship culture ( $B=.004$ ;  $p<.001$ ). Figure 8 plots this interaction effect.

[Insert Figure 8 about here]

### **Robustness checks**

As a robustness check, first, we conducted the analyses using fixed effect negative binomial models to control for the unobserved heterogeneity across districts (Table 3). In these models, we dropped the official region dummies as geographical heterogeneity is already captured by the fixed effects. This did not affect our main conclusions. The only exception is the moderating impact of the growth in the number of employers on

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<sup>11</sup> Note that, for the variable of extremely religious votes, we only included the political parties that receive 10 on the religiosity scale. As a robustness check, we also added the political parties that receive 8 and 9 on the religiosity scale to the measure. The results remain the same.

globalization (Model 5 in Table 3). The coefficient of this interaction term is again positive but now not significant.<sup>12</sup>

[Insert Table 3 about here]

Second, we included (lagged) GDP per capita at the country level in our models and repeated the analyses both with GEE and fixed effect negative binomial models. The reason we did not include (lagged) GDP per capita in the models in our main analyses is its high correlation with our (lagged) KOF globalization index (.84). For the GEE negative binomial models, the results did not fundamentally change except the ones with respect to Hypothesis 1, which is now also supported. For the fixed effect negative binomial models, the results are completely similar to the fixed effect models reported in Table 3 without GDP per capita.<sup>13</sup> All in all, these additional findings suggest that our results are not driven by the steady growth of GDP per capita in Turkey during our observation window.

Finally, we ran separate analyses for the economic, political and social dimensions of KOF globalization index. For the economic globalization index, we find support for all hypotheses except Hypotheses 4b (Table 4). For the political globalization index we only found support for Hypothesis 1 (Model 2, Table 5). Finally, for the social globalization index, all hypotheses are supported (Table 6).

[Insert Tables 4, 5, and 6 about here]

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<sup>12</sup> The number of observations decreases to 1449 because of the omission of districts that did never experience entry of a hybrid school during our observation period.

<sup>13</sup> These tables are not included in the paper, but are available upon request.

## **DISCUSSION**

In this paper, we analyzed the impact of globalization on the emergence of hybrid organizational forms. We proposed that the impact of globalization depends on three local-level characteristics: the presence of institutional repertoire; the motivation of the local community to adapt to global ideas, values and practices; and, finally, the fit between global and local ideas, values and practices. We tested our hypotheses on Islamic education in Turkey between 1985 and 2007. In this period, Turkey experienced a growing impact of globalization.

We find, firstly, that the founding rate of the hybrid school form increases with the number of parent school forms, namely Anatolian and Imam Hatip schools, as a consequence of the experience of the local community with different organizational forms and their legitimacy spillover effects. However, in our context, even though the presence of parent forms has a main effect on hybrid school foundings, it does not moderate the impact of globalization. Secondly, polarization in a local community moderates the impact of globalization on hybrid school foundings: the higher the religious/ideological polarization, the higher the religious faction's motivation to blend cosmopolitan and religious norms and values into a hybrid one when globalization increases. Due to globalization, cosmopolitan education gained importance. Even before Turkey experienced the impact of globalization, Anatolian schools already accommodated cosmopolitan values. However, Imam Hatip schools are traditional religious schools. As a result of the cosmopolitan values, norms and practices that spread all around the world, in order to keep up with the secular faction, Islamic education adopted the cosmopolitan template.

Thirdly, we find that the impact of globalization on hybrid school foundings is attenuated by the extremely religious votes in a local district as the community becomes more rigid about adapting to cosmopolitan norms, values and practices. Similarly, the impact of globalization on the founding rate of hybrid schools increases with the growth in the number of employers in a local district. This finding indicates that the presence of a strong entrepreneurial culture resonates with economic globalization, and therefore stimulates adaptation to globalization. We also analyzed the interaction between extreme religious votes and growth in the number of employers. Although the proportion of extremely religious votes has a negative moderating effect on hybrid school foundings, we find that such communities do adapt to the global world when the community has a strong local entrepreneurship culture. One interpretation is that adaptation is then instrumental for the extremely religious community. The religious population's motivation to blend the global with the local increases when people benefit from this.

As a robustness check, we further examined the impact of the different dimensions of globalization: economic, political, and social dimensions. Particularly economic and social globalization is important to explain the emergence of hybrid forms, whereas political globalization is not. Perhaps the latter form of globalization in itself does not suffice to affect people's values and motivations.

In this study, we took the neo-institutional and glocalization theories and combined those with the insights from organizational ecology in order to understand the impact of globalization on the emergence and expansion of hybrid organizational forms. Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First of all, the responses of organizations to different widespread institutional logics differ depending on the context

(Oliver, 1991). Organizations may resist adapting new institutional logics; they may replace an old institutional logic with a new one; or organizations may adapt to a widespread institutional logic by blending the old and new. There is a range of responses available to organizations facing institutional pressure. In this study, by focusing on globalization as a blending force, we analyze the contexts in which hybrid organizational forms most likely occur as a reaction to globalization. According to neo-institutional theory, organizations are passive recipients of institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). While this perspective underestimates the role of agency, combining these insights with the glocalization literature explains the emergence of hybrid organizational forms as a strategic reaction to globalization. By doing so, our study also contributes to glocalization theory. According to glocalization theory, local cultures may critically adapt or resist global phenomena, and the creation of localities is a standard component of globalization (Robertson et al., 1998). We argue that different versions of modernity might emerge depending on the specific interplay between the global and the local. Therefore, in order to understand when, where, and why hybrid forms emerge as a reaction to globalization, it is important to analyze the local-level characteristics that moderate the impact of globalization. Our study is one of the first systematic studies analyzing the impact of this interplay on the emergence of hybrid organizational forms.

Secondly, our study contributes to the organizational ecology literature. According to this literature, hybrid forms meet sharp punishment, particularly if the category codes are oppositional or involve moral imperatives (Kovacs and Hannan, 2010). However, if the community has a lot at stake and therefore has a strong motivation for blending oppositional categories, then hybrid forms emerge and do not get penalized.

Therefore, it is important to take into account the dynamics that trigger the adaptation process, such as the strong ideological polarization in Turkey. In addition, little attention has been paid to the processes that lead to the emergence of hybrid forms, and under which conditions boundaries dissolve to produce hybridity (Lamont and Molnar, 2002). In this paper, we analyzed the role of globalization on institutional change leading to the mixing of blueprints belonging to opposing categories, which is a widely neglected topic in the literature (Rao, Monin, and Durand, 2005).

Thirdly, another understudied topic in the literature is the variation in education systems across different countries. The convergence process is very well reflected in the literature (Anderson-Levitt, 2003). However, the variation across different societies, and the reasons behind this variation, is an understudied topic. Even though there is a convergence process going on in education systems all around the world, there are still particularities at the local level, such as the presence of religion. Our study contributes to this literature by reflecting on the reasons behind this variation. Finally, our study provides an analysis of the glocalization process in Turkey by stressing the main local-level drivers behind the adaptation to globalization by focusing on Islamic education.

Our study is not without limitations, which provide opportunities for further research. First of all, there is the question as to the extent to which our results are generalizable to other settings. Given that globalization is a very broad topic and given that there are many different studies in different fields, this question is difficult to answer. However, we see that similar hybrid organizational forms emerge as a consequence of globalization, such as Islamic banks (Segrado, 2005). Islamic banks operate according to the principles of Islamic law; however, at the same time, the products and services



provided by Islamic banks are similar to the ones provided by conventional banks. Islamic banks are hybrid in the sense of combining modern methods of business and finance with Islamic laws concerning economics. Another example is the emergence of the Integrated Islamic schools that were founded in Indonesia, also in 1980s (Hasan, 2009). These schools combine Islamic education with a modern curriculum and are mostly preferred by the elite class. The reasons behind the emergence of these hybrid school forms can be explained by local-level characteristics, such as the growing entrepreneurial class in Indonesia. Another driver is the ideological polarization within the different sects of Muslim population and between different religions (Hasan, 2009).

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
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
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**Figure 1**



**Figure 2**


**The density of regular high schools, 1985-2007**






**Figure 3**

**The density of Imam Hatip, Anatolian, and hybrid high schools, 1985-2007**




**Figure 4**


**KOF Globalization Index and its three dimensions for Turkey, 1985-2007**




**Figure 5**  
**GDP per capita in Turkey, 1985-2007**




**Figure 6**  
**The interaction effect of globalization and secular-religious polarization on hybrid school foundings**




**Figure 7A**  
**The interaction effect of globalization and extreme religious votes on hybrid school foundings**



**Figure 7B**  
**The interaction effect of globalization and employer growth on hybrid school foundings**



**Figure 8**  
**The interaction effect of extreme religious votes and employer growth on hybrid school foundings**



**Table 1**  
**Descriptives and correlations of major variables under study**

|  | Mean     | S.D.  | Min    | Max   | 1    | 2     | 3    | 4     | 5     | 6     | 7     | 8     | 9     | 10   | 11 |
|--|----------|-------|--------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|----|
| 1. Hybrid schools foundings                    | .12      | .42   | 0      | 7     | -    |       |      |       |       |       |       |       |       |      |    |
| 2. Ln (District population) ( <i>t-1</i> )     | 13.19    | .82   | 10.13  | 16.32 | .19* | -     |      |       |       |       |       |       |       |      |    |
| 3. Educational expenditure ( <i>t-1</i> )      | 10.58    | 2.19  | 7.23   | 14.62 | .16* | -.01  | -    |       |       |       |       |       |       |      |    |
| 4. GDP growth ( <i>t-1</i> )                   | 4.43     | 4.86  | -7.50  | 9.49  | .08* | -.003 | -.02 | -     |       |       |       |       |       |      |    |
| 5. Votes religious parties                     | 12.25    | 10.42 | 0      | 51.6  | .01  | -.01  | .05* | -.01  | -     |       |       |       |       |      |    |
| 6. Polarization                                | .80      | .18   | .26    | 1.38  | -.02 | .13*  | .12* | .05*  | .16*  | -     |       |       |       |      |    |
| 7. KOF globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )      | 5.57e-08 | 7.75  | -15.9  | 11.84 | .08* | -.03  | .02  | -.08* | -.04  | -.46* | -     |       |       |      |    |
| 8. Density hybrid schools ( <i>t-1</i> )       | .96      | 1.41  | 0      | 16    | .12* | .43*  | .005 | .02   | -.07* | -.30* | .47*  | -     |       |      |    |
| 9. Density cosmopolitan schools ( <i>t-1</i> ) | 4.11     | 5.58  | 0      | 77    | .25* | .66*  | .06* | -.001 | -.10* | -.12* | .33*  | .75*  | -     |      |    |
| 10. Density religious schools ( <i>t-1</i> )   | 5.45     | 3.90  | 0      | 23    | .21* | .73*  | -.03 | .004  | .02   | -.14* | .02   | .56*  | .63*  | -    |    |
| 11. Employer number growth. ( <i>t-1</i> )     | 7.82     | 5.25  | -11.11 | 52.5  | .01  | .08*  | .26* | -.06* | .28*  | .27*  | -.23* | -.18* | -.13* | -.01 | -  |

*n*=1507; \* = *p* < .05 (two-tailed).

**Table 2**  
**Negative binomial GEE regression estimates of the founding rate of hybrid schools, 1985-2007**

|   | <b>Model 1</b>      | <b>Model 2</b>      | <b>Model 3</b>    | <b>Model 4</b>     | <b>Model 5</b>      | <b>Model 6</b>      |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Constant  | -11.81***<br>(1.07) | -12.01***<br>(2.31) | -10.02*<br>(1.03) | -11.19***<br>(.96) | -11.52***<br>(1.04) | -10.68***<br>(1.22) |
| GDP Growth ( <i>t-1</i> )   | .11***<br>(.01)     | .08***<br>(.02)     | .10***<br>(.01)   | .11***<br>(.01)    | .11***<br>(.01)     | .12***<br>(.01)     |
| Educational expenditure ( <i>t-1</i> )  | .35***<br>(.03)     | .32***<br>(.03)     | .35***<br>(.03)   | .33***<br>(.03)    | .37***<br>(.03)     | .33***<br>(.03)     |
| KOF Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )  | .09***<br>(.01)     | .11**<br>(.04)      | -.07<br>(.05)     | .12***<br>(.02)    | .04<br>(.03)        | .09***<br>(.01)     |
| District territory change   | .35***<br>(.08)     | .18<br>(.17)        | -.05<br>(.11)     | .29***<br>(.09)    | .36***<br>(.09)     | .29**<br>(.09)      |
| Mediterranean region  | -.07<br>(.12)       | -.03<br>(.19)       | -.16<br>(.14)     | -.11<br>(.12)      | -.33*<br>(.15)      | -.15<br>(.12)       |
| Eastern Anatolia  | -.55**<br>(.20)     | -.66**<br>(.22)     | -.58**<br>(.21)   | -.61***<br>(.19)   | -.59**<br>(.20)     | -.69***<br>(.20)    |
| Aegean region   | .09<br>(.12)        | -.01<br>(.17)       | .06<br>(.11)      | .07<br>(.12)       | -.10<br>(.11)       | .07<br>(.12)        |
| Southeast Anatolia  | -.68***<br>(.20)    | -.80***<br>(.25)    | -.65**<br>(.23)   | -.74***<br>(.19)   | -.75***<br>(.22)    | -.81***<br>(.19)    |
| Central Anatolia  | -1.19***<br>(.15)   | -.85***<br>(.20)    | -.75***<br>(.10)  | -1.11***<br>(.12)  | -1.01***<br>(.10)   | -1.32***<br>(.16)   |
| Black Sea region  | -.11<br>(.13)       | .04<br>(.22)        | -.14<br>(.16)     | -.10<br>(.12)      | -.02<br>(.12)       | -.20<br>(.13)       |
| Ln (District population) ( <i>t-1</i> )   | .25**<br>(.09)      | .38*<br>(.19)       | .24**<br>(.08)    | .26***<br>(.08)    | .30***<br>(.09)     | .28*<br>(.11)       |
| Votes Islamic parties   | .03***<br>(.01)     | .02*<br>(.01)       | .03***<br>(.01)   | .03***<br>(.01)    | .02**<br>(.01)      | -.004<br>(.01)      |
| Ideological polarization  | -.80**<br>(.28)     | -.17<br>(.41)       | -1.31**<br>(.50)  | -.23<br>(.38)      | -1.28***<br>(.35)   | -.24***<br>(.33)    |
| Employer number growth ( <i>t-1</i> )   | .02<br>(.01)        | .01<br>(.02)        | .02<br>(.01)      | .02<br>(.01)       | .08***<br>(.02)     | -.07***<br>(.02)    |
| Density hybrid schools ( <i>t-1</i> )   | -.40***<br>(.04)    | -.29**<br>(.10)     | -.36***<br>(.04)  | -.37***<br>(.03)   | -.35***<br>(.03)    | -.42***<br>(.04)    |
| Density regular schools ( <i>t-1</i> )  | .00002<br>(.003)    | -.002<br>(.003)     | .003<br>(.003)    | -.0003<br>(.003)   | .004<br>(.003)      | -.001<br>(.003)     |
| Density Imam Hatip schools ( <i>t-1</i> )   | .14***<br>(.01)     | .12***<br>(.04)     | .12***<br>(.01)   | .14***<br>(.01)    | .12***<br>(.01)     | .15***<br>(.01)     |
| Density Anatolian schools ( <i>t-1</i> )  | .05***<br>(.01)     | .03<br>(.05)        | .05***<br>(.01)   | .05***<br>(.01)    | .04***<br>(.01)     | .05***<br>(.01)     |
| KOF Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )* Density Imam Hatip schools ( <i>t-1</i> )                                     |                     | -.001<br>(.003)     |                   |                    |                     |                     |
| KOF Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )* Density Anatolian schools ( <i>t-1</i> )                                      |                     | -.01<br>(.005)      |                   |                    |                     |                     |
| Density Imam Hatip sch. ( <i>t-1</i> )* Density Anatolian schools ( <i>t-1</i> )                                      |                     | -.0001<br>(.002)    |                   |                    |                     |                     |
| KOF Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )* Density Imam Hatip sch. ( <i>t-1</i> )* Density Anatolian sch. ( <i>t-1</i> ) |                     | .0003<br>(.0003)    |                   |                    |                     |                     |
| KOF Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )*polarization   |                     |                     | .20***<br>(.06)   |                    |                     |                     |
| KOF Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )*Vote Islamic   |                     |                     |                   | -.002*<br>(.001)   |                     |                     |
| KOF Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )*employer growth ( <i>t-1</i> )   |                     |                     |                   |                    | .01*<br>(.004)      |                     |
| Votes Islamic parties*employer growth ( <i>t-1</i> )  |                     |                     |                   |                    |                     | .004***<br>(.001)   |
| Wald Chi2   | 1537.21***          | 2157.96***          | 2257.66***        | 1807.33***         | 1656.04***          | 1521.57***          |

*N* = 1507; \* = *p* < .05, \*\* = *p* < .01, \*\*\* = *p* < .001 (two-tailed); robust standard errors in parentheses.

**Table 3**  
**Fixed effect negative binomial regression estimates of the founding rate of hybrid schools, 1985-2007**

|   | Model 1          | Model 2          | Model 3          | Model 4          | Model 5          | Model 6          |
|---|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Constant  | 6.52<br>(8.34)   | 1.14<br>(10.71)  | 7.14<br>(8.70)   | 8.04<br>(8.25)   | 5.78<br>(8.34)   | 8.76<br>(8.36)   |
| GDP Growth ( <i>t-1</i> )   | .08***<br>(.02)  | .10***<br>(.02)  | .09***<br>(.02)  | .08***<br>(.02)  | .09***<br>(.02)  | .09***<br>(.02)  |
| Educational expenditure ( <i>t-1</i> )  | .26***<br>(.04)  | .27***<br>(.05)  | .29***<br>(.05)  | .20***<br>(.05)  | .26***<br>(.05)  | .23***<br>(.05)  |
| KOF Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )  | .11***<br>(.02)  | .11***<br>(.04)  | -.05<br>(.09)    | .15***<br>(.03)  | .07<br>(.04)     | .11***<br>(.02)  |
| District territory change   | .13<br>(.49)     | -.04<br>(.50)    | .17<br>(.50)     | .04<br>(.49)     | .24<br>(.50)     | .002<br>(.49)    |
| Ln (District population) ( <i>t-1</i> )   | -.74<br>(.60)    | -.13<br>(.78)    | -.74<br>(.63)    | -.83<br>(.59)    | -.69<br>(.60)    | -.83<br>(.60)    |
| Votes Islamic parties   | .01<br>(.01)     | .01<br>(.01)     | .01<br>(.01)     | .01<br>(.01)     | .0003<br>(.02)   | -.05*<br>(.02)   |
| Ideological polarization  | -.52<br>(1.13)   | -.95<br>(1.15)   | -1.37<br>(1.22)  | -.33<br>(1.14)   | -.68<br>(1.14)   | -.22<br>(1.16)   |
| Employer number growth ( <i>t-1</i> )   | .01<br>(.03)     | -.003<br>(.03)   | .01<br>(.03)     | .02<br>(.03)     | .06<br>(.05)     | -.11*<br>(.05)   |
| Density hybrid schools ( <i>t-1</i> )   | -.71***<br>(.11) | -.90***<br>(.12) | -.71***<br>(.11) | -.74***<br>(.12) | -.70***<br>(.11) | -.77***<br>(.12) |
| Density regular schools ( <i>t-1</i> )  | .01<br>(.01)     | .003<br>(.02)    | .01<br>(.01)     | .01<br>(.01)     | .01<br>(.01)     | .01<br>(.01)     |
| Density Imam Hatip schools ( <i>t-1</i> )   | .04<br>(.07)     | -.16<br>(.10)    | .05<br>(.07)     | .05<br>(.07)     | .05<br>(.07)     | .08<br>(.07)     |
| Density Anatolian schools ( <i>t-1</i> )  | .10***<br>(.03)  | .05<br>(.07)     | .09***<br>(.03)  | .09***<br>(.03)  | .10***<br>(.03)  | .08**<br>(.03)   |
| KOF Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )*<br>Density Imam Hatip sch. ( <i>t-1</i> )   |                  | .01<br>(.004)    |                  |                  |                  |                  |
| KOF Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )*<br>Density Anatolian sch. ( <i>t-1</i> )  |                  | -.01<br>(.01)    |                  |                  |                  |                  |
| Density Imam Hatip sch. ( <i>t-1</i> )*<br>Density Anatolian sch. ( <i>t-1</i> )  |                  | .004<br>(.004)   |                  |                  |                  |                  |
| KOF Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )*<br>Density Imam Hatip sch. ( <i>t-1</i> )*<br>Density Anatolian sch. ( <i>t-1</i> ) |                  | .001<br>(.0004)  |                  |                  |                  |                  |
| KOF Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )*polarization   |                  |                  | .20*<br>(.10)    |                  |                  |                  |
| KOF Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )*Vote Islamic   |                  |                  |                  | -.003*<br>(.002) |                  |                  |
| KOF Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )*employer growth ( <i>t-1</i> )   |                  |                  |                  |                  | .01<br>(.01)     |                  |
| Votes Islamic parties*employer growth ( <i>t-1</i> )  |                  |                  |                  |                  |                  | .01***<br>(.002) |
| Wald Chi2   | 127.69***        | 141.10***        | 128.08***        | 128.76***        | 129.44***        | 133.96***        |

*N* = 1449; =  $p < .05$ , \*\* =  $p < .01$ , \*\*\* =  $p < .001$  (two-tailed); robust standard errors in parentheses.

**Table 4**  
**Negative binomial GEE regression estimates of the founding rate of hybrid schools,**  
**1985-2007 (KOF Economic Globalization Index)**

|   | Model 1            | Model 2            | Model 3             | Model 4             | Model 5            | Model 6             |
|---|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| Constant  | -9.93***<br>(1.79) | -9.84***<br>(2.13) | -10.14***<br>(1.68) | -10.17***<br>(1.94) | -9.45***<br>(1.86) | -10.17***<br>(1.68) |
| GDP Growth ( <i>t-1</i> )   | .10***<br>(.02)    | .10*<br>(.05)      | .10***<br>(.02)     | .10***<br>(.02)     | .10***<br>(.02)    | .11***<br>(.02)     |
| Educational expenditure ( <i>t-1</i> )  | .38***<br>(.04)    | .35***<br>(.05)    | .37***<br>(.03)     | .35***<br>(.04)     | .39***<br>(.04)    | .36***<br>(.04)     |
| KOF Economic Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )   | .11***<br>(.02)    | .12***<br>(.03)    | -.01<br>(.05)       | .15***<br>(.03)     | .07<br>(.04)       | .11***<br>(.02)     |
| District territory change   | .06<br>(.13)       | .17<br>(.14)       | .06<br>(.13)        | .29*<br>(.12)       | .10<br>(.12)       | .20<br>(.14)        |
| Mediterranean region  | -.23<br>(.16)      | -.35<br>(.22)      | -.22<br>(.16)       | .08<br>(.17)        | -.19<br>(.17)      | .04<br>(.17)        |
| Eastern Anatolia  | -.64**<br>(.21)    | -.90***<br>(.20)   | -.68**<br>(.22)     | -.60**<br>(.23)     | -.59**<br>(.23)    | -.67**<br>(.24)     |
| Aegean region   | -.19<br>(.13)      | .06<br>(.21)       | -.21<br>(.13)       | .05<br>(.17)        | -.17<br>(.12)      | .07<br>(.16)        |
| Southeast Anatolia  | -.73*<br>(.29)     | -1.32***<br>(.32)  | -.76**<br>(.29)     | -.77*<br>(.33)      | -.69*<br>(.31)     | -.85*<br>(.35)      |
| Central Anatolia  | -1.03***<br>(.17)  | -1.66***<br>(.35)  | -.90***<br>(.18)    | -1.01***<br>(.19)   | -1.02***<br>(.17)  | -1.06***<br>(.17)   |
| Black Sea region  | -.23<br>(.14)      | -.22<br>(.20)      | -.29<br>(.18)       | -.04<br>(.16)       | -.21<br>(.15)      | -.09<br>(.18)       |
| Ln (District population) ( <i>t-1</i> )   | .15<br>(.16)       | .19<br>(.16)       | .22<br>(.15)        | .17<br>(.17)        | .10<br>(.17)       | .21<br>(.16)        |
| Votes Islamic parties   | .02***<br>(.01)    | .02<br>(.01)       | .02**<br>(.01)      | .02*<br>(.01)       | .02*<br>(.01)      | -.02*<br>(.01)      |
| Ideological polarization  | -.46<br>(.34)      | .03<br>(.53)       | -.96*<br>(.46)      | -.22<br>(.43)       | -.68<br>(.48)      | .08<br>(.38)        |
| Employer number growth ( <i>t-1</i> )   | .02<br>(.01)       | .004<br>(.02)      | .02<br>(.01)        | .02<br>(.01)        | .04<br>(.03)       | -.09***<br>(.02)    |
| Density hybrid schools ( <i>t-1</i> )   | -.45***<br>(.11)   | -.77***<br>(.11)   | -.39***<br>(.09)    | -.46***<br>(.12)    | -.43***<br>(.09)   | -.48***<br>(.14)    |
| Density regular schools ( <i>t-1</i> )  | .005<br>(.003)     | .03***<br>(.01)    | .01*<br>(.003)      | .01**<br>(.003)     | .01<br>(.003)      | .01***<br>(.002)    |
| Density Imam Hatip schools ( <i>t-1</i> )   | .16***<br>(.01)    | .12<br>(.03)       | .13***<br>(.02)     | .15***<br>(.02)     | .16***<br>(.01)    | .16***<br>(.02)     |
| Density Anatolian schools ( <i>t-1</i> )  | .03**<br>(.01)     | -.04<br>(.04)      | .02*<br>(.01)       | .01<br>(.01)        | .03*<br>(.01)      | .005<br>(.01)       |
| KOF Econ. Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )*<br>Density Imam Hatip sch. ( <i>t-1</i> )   |                    | .0001<br>(.003)    |                     |                     |                    |                     |
| KOF Econ. Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )*<br>Density Anatolian sch. ( <i>t-1</i> )  |                    | .002<br>(.004)     |                     |                     |                    |                     |
| Density Imam Hatip sch. ( <i>t-1</i> )* Density<br>Anatolian sch. ( <i>t-1</i> )  |                    | -.01*<br>(.003)    |                     |                     |                    |                     |
| KOF Econ. Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )*<br>Density Imam Hatip sch. ( <i>t-1</i> )* Density<br>Anatolian sch. ( <i>t-1</i> ) |                    | .001**<br>(.0004)  |                     |                     |                    |                     |
| KOF Econ. Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )*polarization   |                    |                    | .12*<br>(.05)       |                     |                    |                     |
| KOF Econ. Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )*Vote<br>Islamic  |                    |                    |                     | -.003*<br>(.001)    |                    |                     |
| KOF Econ. Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )*employer<br>growth ( <i>t-1</i> )  |                    |                    |                     |                     | .01<br>(.005)      |                     |
| Votes Islamic parties*employer growth ( <i>t-1</i> )  |                    |                    |                     |                     |                    | .005***<br>(.001)   |
| Wald Chi2   | 1986.01***         | 1033.10***         | 2831.50***          | 1801.29***          | 1943.88***         | 1753.96***          |

*n* = 1507; \* = *p* < .05, \*\* = *p* < .01, \*\*\* = *p* < .001 (two-tailed); robust standard errors in parentheses.



**Table 5**  
**Negative binomial GEE regression estimates of the founding rate of hybrid schools,**  
**1985-2007 (KOF Political Globalization Index)**

|  | Model 1             | Model 2             | Model 3             | Model 4            | Model 5             | Model 6            |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| Constant   | -10.44***<br>(1.43) | -10.98***<br>(1.80) | -11.07***<br>(1.41) | -9.56***<br>(1.61) | -11.53***<br>(1.18) | -8.45***<br>(1.42) |
| GDP Growth ( <i>t-1</i> )  | .12***<br>(.02)     | .10***<br>(.02)     | .11***<br>(.02)     | .11***<br>(.02)    | .11***<br>(.02)     | .11***<br>(.02)    |
| Educational expenditure ( <i>t-1</i> )   | .31***<br>(.03)     | .32***<br>(.02)     | .34***<br>(.04)     | .29***<br>(.03)    | .31***<br>(.03)     | .26***<br>(.03)    |
| KOF Political Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )   | .13***<br>(.02)     | .17***<br>(.04)     | .04<br>(.08)        | .14***<br>(.02)    | .12***<br>(.03)     | .11***<br>(.01)    |
| District territory change  | .23*<br>(.11)       | -.13<br>(.13)       | -.05<br>(.12)       | .41***<br>(.11)    | .29**<br>(.11)      | .22<br>(.12)       |
| Mediterranean region   | -.13<br>(.16)       | -.34*<br>(.16)      | -.23<br>(.17)       | -.19<br>(.17)      | -.16<br>(.15)       | -.22<br>(.16)      |
| Eastern Anatolia   | -.59***<br>(.18)    | -.52**<br>(.19)     | -.58**<br>(.20)     | -.65***<br>(.19)   | -.67***<br>(.17)    | -.75***<br>(.20)   |
| Aegean region  | .12<br>(.11)        | -.04<br>(.11)       | -.05<br>(.14)       | -.04<br>(.13)      | -.04<br>(.15)       | -.08<br>(.12)      |
| Southeast Anatolia   | -.79***<br>(.22)    | -.65**<br>(.25)     | -.79**<br>(.26)     | -.80***<br>(.22)   | -.84***<br>(.21)    | -.81***<br>(.22)   |
| Central Anatolia   | -1.01***<br>(.13)   | -.99***<br>(.15)    | -.92***<br>(.15)    | -.90***<br>(.11)   | -.95***<br>(.11)    | -1.16***<br>(.14)  |
| Black Sea region   | .12<br>(.12)        | .06<br>(.11)        | .11<br>(.13)        | -.27<br>(.16)      | .18<br>(.10)        | -.42*<br>(.19)     |
| Ln (District population) ( <i>t-1</i> )  | .17<br>(.13)        | .22<br>(.14)        | .27*<br>(.13)       | .18<br>(.15)       | .26**<br>(.10)      | .15<br>(.14)       |
| Votes Islamic parties  | .03***<br>(.004)    | .03***<br>(.01)     | .03***<br>(.005)    | .03***<br>(.01)    | .02***<br>(.003)    | -.02<br>(.01)      |
| Ideological polarization   | .48<br>(.31)        | -.24<br>(.32)       | -.30<br>(.51)       | -.45<br>(.29)      | .38<br>(.25)        | -.10<br>(.29)      |
| Employer number growth ( <i>t-1</i> )  | .01<br>(.01)        | -.003<br>(.01)      | -.01<br>(.01)       | .03*<br>(.02)      | .03**<br>(.01)      | -.05*<br>(.02)     |
| Density hybrid schools ( <i>t-1</i> )  | -.45***<br>(.08)    | -.48***<br>(.06)    | -.49***<br>(.08)    | -.38***<br>(.08)   | -.36***<br>(.06)    | -.39***<br>(.09)   |
| Density regular schools ( <i>t-1</i> )   | .001<br>(.002)      | .01*<br>(.003)      | .005<br>(.003)      | .004<br>(.002)     | .002<br>(.002)      | .002<br>(.002)     |
| Density Imam Hatip schools ( <i>t-1</i> )  | .14***<br>(.01)     | 1.02***<br>(.30)    | .12***<br>(.01)     | .14***<br>(.02)    | .13***<br>(.01)     | .17***<br>(.02)    |
| Density Anatolian schools ( <i>t-1</i> )   | .05***<br>(.01)     | 1.31*<br>(.57)      | .04***<br>(.01)     | .03*<br>(.01)      | .03***<br>(.01)     | .02*<br>(.01)      |
| KOF Polit. Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )* Density Imam Hatip sch. ( <i>t-1</i> )  |                     | -.01**<br>(.003)    |                     |                    |                     |                    |
| KOF Polit. Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )* Density Anatolian sch. ( <i>t-1</i> )   |                     | -.01*<br>(.01)      |                     |                    |                     |                    |
| Density Imam Hatip sch. ( <i>t-1</i> )* Density Anatolian sch. ( <i>t-1</i> )  |                     | -.17***<br>(.04)    |                     |                    |                     |                    |
| KOF Polit. Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )* Density Imam Hatip sch. ( <i>t-1</i> )* Density Anatolian sch. ( <i>t-1</i> ) |                     | .002***<br>(.0004)  |                     |                    |                     |                    |
| KOF Polit. Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )*polarization   |                     |                     | .11<br>(.09)        |                    |                     |                    |
| KOF Polit. Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )*Vote Islamic   |                     |                     |                     | -.002<br>(.001)    |                     |                    |
| KOF Polit. Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )*employer growth ( <i>t-1</i> )   |                     |                     |                     |                    | .003<br>(.003)      |                    |
| Votes Islamic parties*employer growth ( <i>t-1</i> )   |                     |                     |                     |                    |                     | .004***<br>(.001)  |
| Wald Chi2  | 2950.26***          | 2704.45***          | 2543.54***          | 2436.15***         | 2749.38***          | 2649.77***         |

*N* = 1507; \* = *p* < .05, \*\* = *p* < .01, \*\*\* = *p* < .001 (two-tailed); robust standard errors in parentheses.

**Table 6**  
**Negative binomial GEE regression estimates of the founding rate of hybrid schools,**  
**1985-2007 (KOF Social Globalization Index)**

|   | Model 1            | Model 2            | Model 3             | Model 4            | Model 5            | Model 6            |
|---|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Constant  | -8.30***<br>(1.24) | -9.53***<br>(1.73) | -10.49***<br>(1.71) | -8.25***<br>(1.30) | -9.45***<br>(1.22) | -6.65***<br>(1.72) |
| GDP Growth ( <i>t-1</i> )   | .11***<br>(.02)    | .13*<br>(.05)      | .08***<br>(.01)     | .11***<br>(.02)    | .10***<br>(.02)    | .12***<br>(.02)    |
| Educational expenditure ( <i>t-1</i> )  | .29***<br>(.02)    | .40***<br>(.08)    | .37***<br>(.03)     | .25***<br>(.03)    | .34***<br>(.03)    | .26***<br>(.03)    |
| KOF Social Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )   | .04**<br>(.01)     | .11***<br>(.03)    | -.11***<br>(.03)    | .06***<br>(.01)    | -.01<br>(.04)      | .05***<br>(.01)    |
| District territory change   | .29*<br>(.12)      | -.07<br>(.26)      | .28*<br>(.11)       | .48***<br>(.11)    | .39***<br>(.12)    | .41***<br>(.11)    |
| Mediterranean region  | -.17<br>(.14)      | -.33<br>(.18)      | -.36*<br>(.15)      | -.02<br>(.12)      | -.17<br>(.14)      | -.002<br>(.12)     |
| Eastern Anatolia  | -.35<br>(.21)      | -.28<br>(.21)      | -.61**<br>(.23)     | -.41<br>(.22)      | -.42*<br>(.19)     | -.62**<br>(.21)    |
| Aegean region   | .02<br>(.13)       | -.18<br>(.12)      | -.15<br>(.12)       | .05<br>(.14)       | .05<br>(.12)       | .08<br>(.14)       |
| Southeast Anatolia  | -.41*<br>(.20)     | -.44<br>(.26)      | -.70<br>(.21)       | -.48*<br>(.19)     | -.55**<br>(.20)    | -.60***<br>(.17)   |
| Central Anatolia  | -1.05***<br>(.12)  | -.96***<br>(.13)   | -1.05***<br>(.13)   | -1.24***<br>(.19)  | -.88***<br>(.11)   | -1.35***<br>(.17)  |
| Black Sea region  | -.07<br>(.13)      | -.17<br>(.13)      | -.32<br>(.18)       | -.08<br>(.14)      | .15<br>(.12)       | -.19<br>(.16)      |
| Ln (District population) ( <i>t-1</i> )   | .13<br>(.09)       | .13<br>(.12)       | .33**<br>(.13)      | .15<br>(.09)       | .16<br>(.09)       | .05<br>(.13)       |
| Votes Islamic parties   | .02**<br>(.01)     | .02***<br>(.005)   | .03***<br>(.01)     | .16***<br>(.04)    | .02*<br>(.01)      | -.03*<br>(.01)     |
| Ideological polarization  | -1.23**<br>(.47)   | -1.39*<br>(.67)    | -10.66*<br>(2.21)   | -1.04*<br>(.48)    | -1.31***<br>(.40)  | -.52***<br>(.38)   |
| Employer number growth ( <i>t-1</i> )   | .03**<br>(.01)     | .02<br>(.01)       | -.004<br>(.01)      | .03***<br>(.01)    | -.44<br>(.24)      | -.07***<br>(.02)   |
| Density hybrid schools ( <i>t-1</i> )   | -.37***<br>(.03)   | -.29***<br>(.05)   | -.34***<br>(.03)    | -.40***<br>(.03)   | -.35***<br>(.02)   | -.41***<br>(.03)   |
| Density regular schools ( <i>t-1</i> )  | -.01***<br>(.001)  | -.01*<br>(.004)    | -.01***<br>(.003)   | -.01***<br>(.001)  | .001<br>(.003)     | -.01***<br>(.001)  |
| Density Imam Hatip schools ( <i>t-1</i> )   | .15***<br>(.01)    | .22*<br>(.10)      | .12***<br>(.02)     | .14***<br>(.02)    | .11***<br>(.01)    | .16***<br>(.02)    |
| Density Anatolian schools ( <i>t-1</i> )  | .09***<br>(.01)    | 1.02***<br>(.27)   | .08***<br>(.01)     | .09***<br>(.01)    | .08***<br>(.01)    | .09**<br>(.01)     |
| KOF Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )* Density Imam Hatip sch. ( <i>t-1</i> )  |                    | -.002<br>(.002)    |                     |                    |                    |                    |
| KOF Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )* Density Anatolian sch. ( <i>t-1</i> )   |                    | -.02***<br>(.01)   |                     |                    |                    |                    |
| Density Imam Hatip sch. ( <i>t-1</i> )* Density Anatolian sch. ( <i>t-1</i> )   |                    | -.04**<br>(.01)    |                     |                    |                    |                    |
| KOF Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )* Density Imam Hatip sch. ( <i>t-1</i> )* Density Anatolian sch. ( <i>t-1</i> ) |                    | .001**<br>(.0003)  |                     |                    |                    |                    |
| KOF Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )*polarization   |                    |                    | .20***<br>(.04)     |                    |                    |                    |
| KOF Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )*Vote Islamic   |                    |                    |                     | -.003**<br>(.001)  |                    |                    |
| KOF Globalization Index ( <i>t-1</i> )*employer growth ( <i>t-1</i> )   |                    |                    |                     |                    | .01*<br>(.01)      |                    |
| Votes Islamic parties*employer growth ( <i>t-1</i> )  |                    |                    |                     |                    |                    | .001***<br>(.001)  |
| Wald Chi2   | 1536.67***         | 2019.14***         | 2098.24***          | 1474.33***         | 1662.95***         | 1702.89***         |

*N* = 1507; \* = *p* < .05, \*\* = *p* < .01, \*\*\* = *p* < .001 (two-tailed); robust standard errors in parentheses.

## APPENDIX A

### Political parties and score on the secular-religious scale (1 to 10)

| Political Parties   | Secular/religious scale |
|---|-------------------------|
| Changing Turkey Party (Degisen Turkiye Partisi): 1998-2002                | 2                       |
| Communist Party of Turkey (Turkiye Komunist Partisi): 2001-               | 1                       |
| Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti): 1985-                       | 2                       |
| Democratic Party (Demokratik Parti): 1970-1980                            | 8                       |
| Democratic Turkey Party (Demokrat Turkiye Partisi): 1997-2005             | 7                       |
| Democracy and Peace Party (Demokrasi ve Baris Partisi): 1996-2002         | 1                       |
| Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi): 2001-                                    | 10                      |
| Great Union Party (Buyuk Birlik Partisi): 1993-                           | 8                       |
| Homeland Party (Yurt Partisi): 2002-                                      | 7                       |
| Independent Turkey Party (Bagimsiz Turkiye Partisi): 2001-                | 10                      |
| Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi): 2001-         | 8                       |
| Labour Party (Emek Partisi): 1996-  | 1                       |
| Liberal Democratic Party (Liberal Demokrat Parti): 1995-                  | 5                       |
| Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi): 1983-                                | 7                       |
| Nation Party (Millet Partisi): 1992-                                      | 8                       |
| Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetci Demokrasi Partisi): 1983-1986     | 5                       |
| Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi): 1969-            | 8                       |
| Nationalist Working Party (Milliyetci Calisma Partisi): 1983-1993         | 9                       |
| New Democracy Movement (Yeni Demokrasi Hareketi): 1994-1997               | 5                       |
| New Party (Yeni Parti): 1993-1997   | 7                       |
| Freedom and Solidarity Party (Ozgurluk ve Dayanisma Partisi): 1996-       | 1                       |
| Peace Party (Baris Partisi): 1996-1999                                    | 1                       |
| People's Ascent Party (Halkin Yukselisi Partisi): 2005-                   | 8                       |
| People's Democracy Party (Halkin Demokrasi Partisi): 1994-2003            | 1                       |
| People's Party (Halkci Parti): 1983-1985                                  | 2                       |
| Rebirth Party (Yeniden Dogus Partisi): 1992-2002                          | 5                       |
| Reformist Democracy Party (Islahatci Demokrasi Partisi): 1984-1992        | 8                       |
| Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi): 1923-                | 2                       |
| Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halkci Parti): 1985-1995 | 2                       |
| Socialist Government Party (Sosyalist İktidar Partisi): 1993-2001         | 1                       |
| Socialist Party (Sosyalist Parti): 1988-1992                              | 1                       |
| True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi): 1983-                                | 8                       |
| Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi): 1997-2001                                 | 10                      |
| Welfare Party (Refah Partisi): 1983-1998                                  | 10                      |
| Worker's Party (Isci Partisi): 1992-                                      | 1                       |
| Young Party (Genc Parti): 2002-   | 5                       |